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1 INTRODUCTION  
?
?
Merciless wilderness with snow and ice as far as the eye can see, a place of exciting expedi-
tions, intimidating military operations and endless natural resources, home of the doomed 
polar pear, noble Inuits and Santa Claus. This kind of romantic image of the Arctic still exists 
as lacking infrastructure and political centers have marginalized the region as a distant and 
inaccessible ‘other’ on the world map. (Dittmer et al. 2011: 203; Wegge 2011: 166; Emmer-
son 2010: 178, 189; Steinberg 2010: 81-82.)  
 
Although many of the romantic misconceptions persist, the concept of a distant region is cer-
tainly changing. Indeed, it has been estimated, that the Arctic is approaching an environmen-
tal and political state-change (Young 2009a: 424). This is a result of a combination of issues 
ranging from climate change and the melting of the Arctic sea-ice, to the increase in economic 
activity and geopolitical instability (Offerdal 2010: 30). According to Smith (2011: 214), the 
circumpolar north will be a region of intensive human activities and growing strategic im-
portance by the year 2050. Already to date, the region has gained growing attention from ac-
tors wanting to benefit from the foreseeable economic boom or to protect the Arctic environ-
ment of its effects.1 These actors have included not only China, as widely noted by the me-
dia2, but also the European Union (hereafter also the EU). 
 
 
1.1 Research questions 
 
 
Although not being an obvious Arctic actor, The European Union nevertheless started to de-
velop its own, standalone Arctic policy in 2008 (European Commission 2008). The reason for 
this has been studied for instance by Østhagen (2011) and thus will not be the objective here. 
Instead, the purpose of this study has been to scrutinize, which concepts have emerged as the 
motives for the EU when developing its Arctic policy. As a student of environmental science, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????1?Greenpeace for instance has been promoting a campaign in 2012 with a huge picture of an arctic fox staring 
you straight in the eye in the organization’s web page with a text “You can save the Arctic” (Greenpeace 2012).?2?See e.g. Byers 2011?
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my special interest has been finding out whether environmental protection is one of these top-
ics as well as how, and to what extent, it is discussed in comparison with the other topics.  
To be more specific, there are three research questions in this study. First, what kind of con-
cepts and categories emerge from the EU’s documents that are relevant to the developing of 
the Arctic policy? Second, how are the environmental issues discussed per se and in relation 
to the other categories? And third, to what extent does the environmental dimension emerge 
in relation to the other topics and how has this changed when comparing the years 2008 and 
2012? 
 
 
1.2 Objectives and limitations 
 
 
I have conducted this study by using a qualitative approach in carefully analyzing the relevant 
documents released by the EU. To be exact, I have applied a method in Grounded theory in-
volving a three-stage coding procedure. There is also a quantitative dimension to this study as 
I have made rough estimations on how often the different concepts have emerged in the doc-
uments thus gaining information on what the documents are really about and how this has 
changed over the years. 
 
There are various themes and aspects related to the Arctic region and to the EU’s Arctic poli-
cy that are not only interesting but strongly linked with each other and hence important when 
considering the bigger picture. However, in order to achieve a focused study on EU’s Arctic 
policy, it is not possible to consider these issues in more detail within this study. These in-
clude first of all the various institutions of the EU as well as the sophisticated decision-
making process, which create a complex system that has been discussed by several scholars 
and in various textbooks (see i.e. Bomberg et al. 2012 or Zito 2005). This system is further 
complicated by the fact that the different institutions have different preferences and there are 
also different views inside the institutions, most notably between the Members of the Parlia-
ment. I will point out some of these differences but a further analysis, although being a very 
interesting aspect, is not possible within this study. However, when the opinions, goals and 
interests of the European Union are discussed, it is good to keep in mind that the EU is by no 
means a unanimous or coherent body. 
11?
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Secondly, the variety of EU policies that affect the Arctic region, such as energy policy, for-
eign policy, Northern Dimension policy, climate policy, and policies concerning fisheries or 
indigenous peoples are not discussed in detail although some of them are mentioned in chap-
ter 1.4. Thirdly, although several of the individual member states have already or are currently 
developing their own Arctic strategies, it is not possible to consider them in the framework of 
this study. 
 
Next, I will shortly introduce the European Union and the Arctic region in light of the objec-
tives of this study. Whereas, in chapter two, I will introduce the material and methods I have 
chosen to conduct this study. Then, in chapter three, I will move to the actual analysis of the 
material. The findings of the analysis will be discussed in detail in chapter four. Finally, in 
chapter five, I will make concluding remarks as well as present some ideas for a future re-
search. 
 
 
1.3 Introduction to EU’s environmental and Arctic policy 
?
?
Being once primarily an economic community, the European Union has come a long way 
aspiring now to be a global power influencing world politics in various fields (Bomberg et al. 
2012: 204). Since the late 1980s, the environment has become an important policy domain in 
the EU that slowly has been broadening its political scope (McCormick 2001:18). The EU has 
taken a very visible leader stance in the international climate change negotiations being also 
concerned in many other global environmental aspects. For five years now, one of these as-
pects has been the Arctic. (Airoldi 2008: 10.) 
 
 
Environmental policy in the EU 
?
The European Union has become the global leader in international environmental politics 
during the past twenty years3. Global environmental problems have required multilateral solu-
tions, which the EU has been willing and prepared to offer. (Kelemen 2010: 335, 346.) In-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????3?For?an?extensive?backround?for?how?the?environmental?policy?has?developed?in?the?EU,?see?i.e.?Kelemen?2010?or?McGormick?2001:?41-67.?
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stead of having a distinct environmental policy, the EU has a variety of policies that relate to 
specific environmental issues, one of them being the Arctic policy (McCormick 2001: 10). 
According to Airoldi (2008: 69) there is a great potential for the EU to drive international 
efforts to address environmental issues in the Arctic, especially when it comes to biodiversity 
loss, chemical emissions, or protection of marine environment.  
 
The main EU constitutional basis, the Treaties signed by the Member States, did not mention 
environmental policy until the 1987 ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) (Zito 2005: 
366; McCormick 2001: 18). Since then, the principles of the environmental policy have been 
introduced over the years and are now generally defined as sustainable development4, a high 
level of protection and the precautionary principle5 (McCormick 2001: 75-77, 84-85). Along 
with  the  SEA,  the  EU set  goals  to  preserve,  protect  and  improve  the  quality  of  the  environ-
ment  as  well  as  to  ensure  a  prudent  and  rational  utilization  of  natural  resources  (Wilkinson  
2002: 41). Furthermore, the EU’s Sixth Environment Action Programme for 2002-2012 fo-
cuses on priority areas such as climate change, nature and biodiversity as well as natural re-
sources and waste (Airoldi: 2008, 59). It may therefore be said that there are several princi-
ples  and  goals  within  the  EU’s  environmental  policy  which  are  applicable  in  the  Arctic  re-
gion. 
 
 
From Northern Dimension to Arctic policy 
 
The EU has engaged in a broad cooperation with the Arctic states as well as with the local 
indigenous peoples thus having also a social influence on the region (Airoldi 2010: 37). Most 
recently underlined by the Commission and High Representative in 2012 (see European 
Commission and… 2012b: 27-30), this has been an essential approach on Arctic affairs and 
the Northern Dimension (ND) Initiative6 has  been  one  of  the  most  important  forums  in  its  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????4?Sustainable?development?has?been?the?central?principle?in?the?EU’s?environmental?policy?since?the?adop-tion?of?the?Single?European?Act?(SEA)?in?1987?(McCormick?2001:?75).?5?According?to?the?precautionary?principle,?the?EU?should?take?action?to?prevent?environmental?degrada-tion?even?if?there?is?not?yet?scientific?evidence?that?this?degradation?will?happen?(McCormick?2001:?84-85).?6?The Northern Dimension Initiative was launched in 1997 by former Finnish Prime minister Paavo Lipponen, 
(see Lipponen: 1997) aiming at enhancing EU’s role in northern Europe and increasing cooperation with the 
Arctic countries (Arter 2000: 677-679). The Northern Dimension covers a wide area from the Arctic region to 
the southern shores of the Baltic Sea although the arctic and sub-arctic areas are defined as priority regions 
(Airoldi 2008: 9, 18). 
13?
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execution concentrating especially on cooperation with Norway and Russia.  The globally 
important themes for cooperation within the ND have been identified as Arctic research, sus-
tainable development and environmental protection, the latter of which being addressed main-
ly through The Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP). (Airoldi 2008: 18, 
20.)  
 
Along with the Northern Dimension, the Arctic started to gain attention in the EU as the 
“Arctic  window”  in  the  ND  (Airoldi  2008:  22).  In  addition,  there  have  been  two  initiatives  
from Norway, namely the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the High North strategy. Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) was founded in 1993 as a body for multilateral cooperation in 
the Barents area (Airoldi 2010: 17). In turn, the High North strategy, nowadays forming a part 
of the EU’s ND policy, was initiated in 2006 with the aim of gaining more attention from the 
EU towards the energy resources of Norway’s high north7 (Offerdal 2010: 31; European Par-
liament 2008b).  
 
Cooperation with Norway and Russia has then taken place mainly within these three frame-
works. The cooperation with Iceland has also lately increased as the negotiations for Iceland’s 
accession to the EU began in June 20098 (European Commission and… 2012a: 11). There has 
also been substantial cooperation with Greenland. Although withdrawing from the EU in 
1985, Greenland has been granted the status of OCT (Overseas Countries and Territories)9 
(Airoldi 2008: 93). The partnership between EU and Greenland provides Greenland with a 
substantial financial support while the EU benefits for instance from fishing possibilities 
within Greenland’s waters (Airoldi 2010: 51). The EU has also cooperation with Canada and 
USA although it hasn’t been as extensive as with the other countries (Airoldi 2008: 27; 2010: 
55).  
 
As i.e. Østhagen (2011: 7) notes, it is not obvious that the EU wants to take action in the Arc-
tic region, which for the most part lies well beyond its borders. It is also noted by the EU it-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????7?The?High?North?is?an?elastic?concept?that?includes?the?parts?of?Russia?and?Nordic?countries?that?are?part?of?the?Barents?Euro-Arctic?Region,?the?Barents?Sea,?the?Norwegian?Sea?as?well?as?the?southern?parts?of?the?Arctic?Ocean?(GeoPolitics?in?the?High?North,?2012).?8?The?advantages?of?the?potential?accession?were?identified?by?the?Parliament?as?strenghtening?European?presence?in?the?Arctic?Council,?strenghtening?EU’s?presence?in?the?Arctic?as?well?as?heightening?its?inter-ests?in?the?region?and?its?protection?(European?Parliament?2010c;?2010d).???9?According?to?Airoldi’s?definition?(2008:?93-94),?these?territories?depend?constitutionally?on???EU?Mem-ber?State?while?not?being?part?of?the?EU?territory.?
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self that it has no direct coastline with the Arctic Ocean, although, as the Parliament stated in 
2011, “a future accession of Iceland to the EU would transform the Union into an Arctic 
coastal entity” (European Commission 2012a; European Parliament 2011a). The Commission 
and the Parliament nevertheless see the EU already as a legitimate actor in the Arctic (Euro-
pean Commission 2008; European Parliament 2010e). The grounds for this are argued to be 
geographical, historical and economic.  
 
The  Commission  and  the  Parliament  states  the  EU as  having  three  Arctic  Member  States10, 
which, as stated by the Parliament in 2008 (European Parliament 2008b), comprise more than 
half of the numeric membership of the Arctic Council along with EU’s associates. These as-
sociates are Norway and Iceland that are part of the European Economic Area (EEA) Agree-
ment,  as  well  as  Russia  that  is  a  close  partner  of  the  EU  within  the  Northern  Dimension  
framework. In addition, Canada and the US are highlighted as strategic Arctic partners. (Eu-
ropean Commission 2012a; European Parliament 2010e; Airoldi 2008: 26.) 
 
In addition to the above mentioned legitimacy grounds, the EU also argues its legitimacy by 
its substantial impact on the Arctic region. As shown in the results of the EU Arctic Footprint 
project, the EU impacts the Arctic in several ways (Cavalieri et al. 2010: ES-6). An important 
reason for this is the fact that the EU is a significant consumer of the Arctic resources (Euro-
pean Commission and… 2012a: 10). However, the EU also has indirectly many positive ef-
fects on the region through its ambitious goals in biodiversity protection as well as reducing 
trans-boundary pollution and climate change11 (Airoldi 2008: 64). In fact, the EU has been the 
leader in international climate change negotiations since the late 1980s and has adopted ambi-
tious goals in reducing its own greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent by the year 202012 
(Hossain 2010: 297-298; Airoldi 2008: 41).  
?
Within the European Union, the Arctic issues are focused under the authority of the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), which was established only in 2010 as a foreign ministry for 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????10?The Member States are Finland, Sweden and Denmark. However, Greenland is self-government under Den-
mark and withdrew from the EU in 1985 (Airoldi 2008: 93; Emmersson 2010: 292). Indeed, the EU has in recent 
years rather begun underlining the three countries as Arctic Council member states (see i.e. European Parliament 
2010e).?11?The EU has had a goal to halt biodiversity loss by 2010. In addition, the EU has for instance adopted a com-
prehensive directive for restricting certain chemicals and has played an active role in the reducing the ozone-
depleating substances. (Airoldi 2008: 61, 64, 66.)?12?These so called 2020-targets also include targets for increasing renewable energy by 20 percent as well as 
decreasing energy consumption by 20 percent within the EU’s borders by the year 2020 (Hossain 2010: 297-
298).?
15?
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the EU. Thus, the Arctic is first and foremost seen as a matter of foreign policy, represented 
by the High Representative. (EEAS 2012.) In addition, several other instances within the 
EU’s institutions operate on Arctic-relevant fields as well. The Arctic affairs are managed in 
the  Commission  by  the  Directorate-General  for  Maritime affairs  and  Fisheries  (DG MARE) 
under Sea basin strategy. Additionally, the Commission’s Environment Directorate-General 
(DG ENV) works in the fields of chemicals, air pollution and biodiversity protection, just to 
name a few, all of which have clear implications to the Arctic (see European Commission 
2012c).  
 
The Parliament,  in turn,  has the EU ARCTIC Forum, which since 2010 has been a platform 
aiming at better understanding of the Arctic changes by interlinking all issues regarding the 
Arctic and facilitating communication (EU ARCTIC Forum 2012). Moreover, the European 
Environment Agency (EEA) has had a significant interest in the Arctic, as the region is rele-
vant to many of its remits in several fields. Since 1997 the EEA has published reports of the 
state of the Arctic environment and has also been part of some of the Arctic Council’s work-
ing groups. (Airoldi 2008: 68; 2010: 31.) 
 
The actual policy-making process in the EU is happening within the seven supranational insti-
tutions,  three  of  which  will  be  an  essential  part  of  this  study,  namely  the  Commission,  the  
Council and the Parliament. The Commission has the exclusive right to propose policy alt-
hough this is often influenced by other institutes and actors. Important policy decisions have 
to be agreed on with the other institutions after which the Commission is responsible in im-
plementing them. After the Treaty of Lisbon came into effect in 2009 the Commission got a 
new post as High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy was established. This post, 
which  also  serves  as  the  Vice  President  of  the  Commission,  is  shared  with  the  Council.  
(Bomberg et al. 2012: 48-56.) The Council (of the European Union)13 in turn is the primary 
decision-making institution together with the European Parliament. The Parliament’s role was 
enhanced  in  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon  and  it  now  co-decides  almost  all  EU  legislation  with  the  
Council. (Ibid.:  2012: 54, 63, 127; Airoldi 2010: 15.) 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????13?The Council of the European Union is not to be mixed with European Council which is an EU institution that 
consist of the Member States’ Heads of Government and is a major agenda setter of the Union (Bomberg et al. 
2012: 60).?
16?
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Interest towards developing an Arctic policy for the EU has risen also in the member coun-
tries in the past years. Especially the influential states France, Germany and Great Britain 
have shown increasing interest initiated in part by the national corporations (Østhagen2011: 
20). For example, BP, a British oil company, has been active in the Arctic region, making a 
deal with a Russian energy company in 2011 to explore and exploit the Arctic hydrocarbon 
resources (BBC 2011).  Denmark, Finland and Sweden on the other hand have naturally had 
the  biggest  interests  in  the  Arctic  affairs.  However,  while  Finland  has  been  the  biggest  sup-
porter of the new policy domain, Denmark has had a negative attitude pursuing rather the in-
terests of Greenland, fearing that the EU wouldn’t take its special interests into account. 
(Østhagen2011: 19-20; Offerdal 2010: 36.)   
 
 
Developing an Arctic policy 
 
The Arctic emerged in the EU’s policies for the first time in 2007 when the Green Paper re-
marked the rapid climate change in the Arctic influencing the whole world and potentially 
becoming a significant challenge for EU Maritime Policy (European Commission 2006: 14). 
Later on that year the Parliament, in turn, in its resolution for a Thematic Strategy on the Pro-
tection and Conservation of the Marine Environment, called on the Commission “to propose 
relevant  measures  for  the  protection  of  the  Arctic  waters”  as  well  as  “to  study  the  prerequi-
sites for establishing the Arctic as a protected area, similar to the Antarctic”14 (European Par-
liament 2006). Answering to this request the following year, the Commission adopted a 
communication named An Integrated Maritime Policy, which included the first concrete men-
tion of Arctic policy being developed and, concerning geopolitical implications of climate 
change, the Commission announced to present a report on strategic issues relating to the Arc-
tic Ocean in 2008 (European Commission 2007: 13). 
 
The year 2008 was a real kick-off for the development of an Arctic policy as there were sev-
eral significant EU-documents released. The first one of these was a paper issued by the High 
Representative Javier Solana and the European Council, titled “Climate Change and Interna-
tional Security” where  the  threats  and  possibilities  caused  by  climate  change  on  the  Arctic  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????14?Establishing?the?Arctic?region?as???protected?area?has?been?one of the central themes in the Parliaments 
view of Arctic policy up until 2011 though never gaining much support from the Commission or from the other 
institutions. An exception to this is the European Economic and Social Committee that in 2009 suggested that 
the Arctic region would be considered as a natural conservation area (European Economic and… 2009).?
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region  were  noted,  as  well  as  the  possible  need  to  develop  an  EU  Arctic  policy  (European  
Commission and… 2008: 8, 11). Seven months later the Parliament adopted a resolution on 
Arctic governance, which inter alia called for a “standalone EU Arctic policy” and asked the 
Commission to contribute to an international treaty for the protection of the area (European 
Parliament 2008b).  
 
The position of the Commission became clear in the Communication that it had promised the 
previous year. Released six months after the Parliaments resolution, the document was titled 
“The European Union and the Arctic region”. The Communication, which was welcomed by 
the Council the following year, not only seeked to justify EU’s legitimacy and interests in the 
region but also listed the three main policy objectives. These were (1) protecting and preserv-
ing the Arctic in unison with its population, (2) promoting sustainable use of resources, and 
(3) contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance. (European Commission 2008.) 
The following month the General Affairs Council welcomed the document in its conclusions 
as “a first layer of an EU Arctic policy” and the objectives have since then been the core of 
the development of an Arctic policy in the EU (Council of the European Union 2008).  
 
The Parliament continued to pursue its own agenda when, in the end of March 2009, it made a 
Joint motion for a resolution on creating an international treaty for the protection of the Arctic 
which, however, was strongly opposed by members of the Commission in the debate held in 
the Parliament the following day (European Parliament 2009a; 2009b). Despite the motion 
being defended by many Members of Parliament (MEPs), the Parliament reluctantly decided 
to postpone the vote on the motion (European Parliament 2009c).  The Council in turn took a 
very neutral position in December 2009, in its conclusions on Arctic issues. Along the lines of 
the Commissions statement, the adopted conclusions underlined the importance for the EU to 
develop its Arctic policy by building on the existing international instruments and enhancing 
its own involvement through cooperative bodies, most importantly the Arctic Council. In ad-
dition, the Council stressed the need for a sustainable use of the living and non-living re-
sources in the fragile Arctic environment. (Council of the European Union 2009.)  
 
To keep Arctic matters on the agenda, the Parliament held a debate on EU policy on Arctic 
issues in the spring of 2010. Several MEPs participated along with Catherine Ashton as the 
new High Representative. Various opinions were stated in the debate ranging from reprehen-
sion  to  EU’s  involvement  in  the  area  in  the  first  place,  to  demands  of  strict  environmental  
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protection on the one hand and plans for extensive extraction of Arctic natural resources on 
the other. However, most statements shared the common concern for the environment in the 
region and called for sustainable action. A significant concern was also expressed towards the 
geopolitical security in the area that in many views required action for defining the area as a 
demilitarized zone. As the High Representative concluded the debate, she encouraged further 
work by the EU in the Arctic and repeated her trust that the region could be protected while 
sustainably using its resources. (European Parliament 2010a.) 
 
The “prospect of initiating international negotiations for the adoption of an international treaty 
for the protection of the Arctic” was once again taken up by the Parliament in its Resolution 
in May 2010 on the upcoming EU-Canada summit (European Parliament 2010b). Notwith-
standing, in early 2011 the Parliament had made, what Weber and Romanyshyn (2011: 857) 
call a “radical U-turn”, in its position. In its resolution on a sustainable EU policy for the High 
North, the Parliament admitted that the idea of an Arctic Treaty would be neither politically 
feasible nor an appropriate way to deal with the challenges in the Arctic (European Parliament 
2011a). Indeed, the approach of the resolution is notably cooperative not only towards the 
other  EU  institutions  but  also  towards  the  Arctic  stakeholders.  The  new  approach  was  wel-
comed by the Commission in the subsequent debate and in fact called the resolution as an 
“important contribution to the gradual building of the EU’s Arctic policy” and as a “third pil-
lar of its basic architecture”15 (European Parliament 2011b).  
 
In its conclusions on Arctic issues in 2009, the Council had requested the Commission to pre-
sent a progress report on the policy development by the end of June 2011 (Council of the Eu-
ropean Union 2009, p. 9). This report, jointly prepared by the Commission and the High Rep-
resentative, was finally published in June 2012 after several postponements, exceeding its 
deadline by a year. On my request, the Representation of the European Commission in Fin-
land enquired about the reason for this delay from the EEAS however without getting an an-
swer.  The delay is also commented by Weber and Romanyshyn (2011: 858) to have been due 
to undeclared circumstances and to have caused criticism from the Parliament.  
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????15?The?cooperative?approach?has?been?very?important?for?the?Commission.?As?Maria?Damanaki,?the?Com-missioner?for?Maritime?Affairs?and?Fisheries?stated?in?2011:?” “We want to ensure that what we do in the 
Arctic aligns with what others are doing” (Damanaki 2011).?
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The progress report, named Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: 
progress since 2008 and next steps, consisted of two parts that on the one hand introduced the 
goals for the future development of the policy domain and on the other hand listed the contri-
butions already achieved since 200816 (European Commission and… 2012a). The Commis-
sion and the High Representative wished to take a comprehensive approach in the communi-
cation towards Arctic issues, underlining “the need for a coherent, targeted EU approach to-
wards the Arctic, building on the EU’s strengths --” (European Commission 2012a, 4).  
 
Building on the policy objectives established in 2008, the communication specified the next 
goals as being knowledge, responsibility and engagement. In practice these would mean con-
tributing to research to address the challenges of environmental and climate changes in the 
Arctic, behaving responsibly by ensuring sustainable use of the Arctic resources, and engag-
ing in more comprehensive a dialogue with all Arctic stakeholders. In fact, it was clearly stat-
ed that the policy stance and future contribution of the EU would be based on this dialogue 
and that discussions on the communication with the Council and European Parliament would 
be welcomed (European Commission and… 2012a: 5). According to the press release related 
to the publication of the communication, the High Representative had stated: “We want to 
show the world that the EU is serious about its commitments towards the Arctic region” (Eu-
ropean Commission 2012b).  
 
As shown in this chapter, the Arctic has gained increasing attention during the past years in 
the EU’s institutions as well as among other Arctic stakeholders. There are certain character-
istics  of  the  Arctic  that  specifically  have  enabled  this  boom.  Those  features,  as  well  as  the  
geopolitical history of the region, are important to acknowledge before beginning the actual 
analysis of the EU’s Arctic policy. 
 
 
 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????16?The communication was joined by a joint staff working document, which was an extensive description of 
everything that the EU had achieved so far in various fields of its Arctic policy (European Commission and… 
2012b). In addition, a ‘questions and answers’ –memo was released explaining the motives and goals of EU’s 
Arctic policy (European Commission 2012a). ?
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1.4 Challenges and opportunities in the Arctic region 
?
There are several principles according to which the Arctic is defined ranging from tempera-
ture and tree line to various political agreements (Østhagen 2011: 9-10; Wegge 2011: 165). 
The most commonly used definition however is the geographical area north of the Arctic Cir-
cle17. This is also how the European Union defines the Arctic (see European Commission 
2008: 2; 2012a). This definition will also be the basis of this master’s thesis although when 
discussing the potential new resources and routes in the Arctic the main attention will be at 
the marine regions. Picture 1 shows the Arctic Circle as well as the sea-ice maximum and 
minimum for 2008. 
 
?
Picture?1:?The?Arctic?Circle?Source:?European?Commission,?Maritime?Affairs?2012?
 
 
The region is characterized by the Arctic Ocean and the circumpolar countries, namely Ice-
land, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, Russian Federation (hereafter Russia), the United States 
(hereafter the US), and Canada. The five latter these states have had closer cooperation as the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????17?Latitude 66° 33? N?
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“Arctic five” since 200818. In addition, Finland and Sweden have somewhat small land areas 
inside the Arctic Circle without having coastline in the Arctic Ocean. (Dodds 2010: 166.) De-
pending on how the Arctic is defined, there are some two to four million people living in the 
area, the largest population being in Russia (ACIA 2005: 1000; Blunden 2009: 122).  There 
are about 290 000 indigenous inhabitants many of which are living by the traditional lifestyles 
thus depending on unchanged environmental circumstances (ACIA 2005: 14; Emmerson 
2010: 137).  
 
 
Environmental challenges 
 
The local population has so far had somewhat small an impact on the Arctic environment, 
albeit there have been serious problems in the region with trans-boundary pollutants, such as 
Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), ozone depleting substances and heavy metals (ACIA 
2005: 1016; Airoldi 2008: 64-66). In addition, there has been a threat of radioactive leakage 
since the Cold War as nuclear waste from military installations was left in several locations 
without proper surveillance (Emmerson 2010: 137). The most pressing issue however today is 
climate change and the various challenges and also opportunities that it is causing for the en-
vironment and society. 
?
Climate change is affecting the Arctic perhaps more than any other region in the world (ACIA 
2005: 54; Østhagen 2011: 10).  The temperature is estimated to rise two to four degrees centi-
grade by 2050 and four to seven degrees centigrade by 2100 while precipitation is presumed 
to increase some eight per cent by 2050 and 20 percent by 2100 (ACIA 2005: 22, 994). As a 
consequence, the ice and snow cover on land and at sea in the Arctic is estimated to start 
melting so that the Arctic Ocean would be ice-free in the summertime of around 2050 and the 
Greenland Ice Sheet would start losing coverage by the end of this century19 (Ibid.: 22, 193, 
997).  
 
There are strong feedback systems in the Arctic relating to the climate change that are pre-
dicted not only to reinforce climate change in the Arctic but also to have serious global con-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????18?The Arctic five adopted the Ilulissat declaration in Arctic Ocean Conference in 2008 underlining their capabil-
ity and wish to handle the arctic affairs by themselves. Iceland, Finland and Sweden were not invited to the con-
ference. (Young 2009a: 424, 428-429.)?19?There is speculation whether these changes will happen even faster, see Emmerson 2010: 150, 158.?
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sequences. These systems include acceleration of warming due to decreasing albedo, i.e. the 
ability of the Earth’s surface to reflect the sun’s heat radiation, freshening of the Arctic Ocean 
and potential slowing down of the thermohaline circulation20 due to increased precipitation 
and runoff from land, and the releasing of huge quantities21 of greenhouse gases from the 
melting permafrost areas. (ACIA 2005: 55, 994, 996, 999-1000.) 
 
These changes are having a profound impact on the snow and ice cover in the Arctic resulting 
in a significant environmental change that has already started (Ibid.: 54, 997). Only about 
three percent of the world’s fauna and flora can be found in the Arctic. Many of these geolog-
ically young species have adapted to the harsh conditions thus being vulnerable to warming 
climate and environmental change, and therefore being at risk of becoming extinct. (Ibid.: 11, 
997-998, 1016.) Along with the ecological changes, the climate change causes also a wide 
range of economic and social changes in the Arctic. These include new opportunities to ex-
ploit the Arctic living and non-living resources, possibilities to navigate on new routes in the 
Arctic Ocean, threats and opportunities faced by the indigenous peoples as well as changes in 
geopolitics in the region. 
 
 
The increasing economic activity 
 
The most important economic activities in the Arctic region are extraction of oil, gas and 
minerals, as well as fishing and tourism (ACIA 2005: 1002). Many governments worldwide 
consider these resources essential for prosperity in the future (Emmerson 2010: 196). There is 
already fairly extensive extraction of oil and natural gas in the Arctic region, the majority of 
which is happening in Siberia and Alaska. Although so far this extraction has happened on-
shore, it is predicted that there are substantial undiscovered offshore oil and gas reserves in 
these same regions. (ACIA 2005: 1002; Smith 2011: 231.)  
 
In fact, the United State Geological Survey (USGS) has estimated that on a global scale the 
largest amount of unexplored petroleum, i.e. 13 percent of oil and 30 percent of gas, is to be 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????20?Thermohaline circulation means ocean circulation that is controlled by temperature and salinity of the water. 
The North Atlantic Ocean, where the water turns heavier as the temperature drops and salinity increases due to 
fresh water forming sea-ice, is considered as a critical part of the circulation. (Osborn & Kleinen 2008.)?21?It is estimated that there are twice as much carbon stored in the Arctic permafrost than there are in all the 
globally remaining oil and coal storages combined (Smith 2011: 287).?
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found in the Arctic seabed (USGS 2008; Gautier et al. 2009: 1178). The exploration of these 
reserves are anticipated to become economically feasible in future as, on the one hand, the 
price of the oil rises and, on the other hand, reduction of sea-ice will allow more offshore plat-
forms as well as easier transportation of the hydrocarbons. (ACIA 2008: 1001; Gautier et al. 
2009: 1176.). In addition, there is a substantial amount of methane in form of hydrates 
trapped in the Arctic permafrost, which is starting to gain interest as an energy form among 
scientists and companies (Emmerson 2010: 218; Smith 2011: 185).  
 
When it comes to fishing, the Arctic seas are one of the most productive and important fishing 
grounds in the world (ACIA 2005: 1002). As a consequence to climate change, there is a pos-
sibility that the fish stocks are moving north and that the increasing primary productivity in 
the oceans could lead to doubling of fishing volumes by 2080’s. (Ibid.: 999; Young 2009b: 
75; Smith 2011: 169.). The possibilities for fishing, as well as accessing other Arctic re-
sources also increase as new shipping routes are emerging in the Arctic Ocean due to thawing 
and melting of the sea-ice (ACIA 2005: 1002; Østhagen 2011: 10).   
 
In fact, the Northwest Passage and especially the Northern Sea Route22 have already been 
open in summertime during the past five years (Smith 2011: 163; European Commission 
and… 2012b: 24). Although many uncertainties still exist, the opening of these routes create a 
huge potential to decrease transportation times and costs, creating also new opportunities for 
tourism that is already increasing significantly in these waters (ACIA 2005: 1002; Emmerson 
2010: 185; Smith 2011: 202, 306).   
 
As the economic development of the Arctic resources is increasing, it is bringing more and 
more people, ships and infrastructure to the region. These activities are bound to have degrad-
ing impacts on the local environment that is ill prepared for massive changes. According to 
Emmerson (2010: 247) the occurrence of some level of environmental damage, an oil spill 
most likely, is not a question of if but when. 
?
?
?
?
?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????22?The Northern Passage, also known as the Northeast Passage, runs along Russia’s northern coastline, whereas 
the Northwest Passage extends from Alaska to the Atlantic Ocean along the northern coast of North America and 
through the Canadian archipelago (Blunden 2009: 122).?
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Geopolitical history and current challenges 
?
It is important to note that the attention, which the Arctic region is getting, is not a new phe-
nomenon, although it has intensified lately due to the increasing economic potential. Young 
(2009b: 74) calls the current point in history the “cooperative moment separating two periods 
of geopolitical tension”. Nonetheless, there is an ongoing discussion on whether the future 
will bring a “race for resources” or growing international cooperation for the Arctic (Dittmer 
et al. 2011: 206). Although the future course for the Arctic is somewhat unsure, the history 
tells a story of a region, which gained growing attention in the 20th century, especially during 
the Second World War and the Cold War.  
 
There were some observations of the Arctic resources and its economic potential already in 
the 19th century, but it wasn’t until the 1930s that the Soviet Union, as the first country, start-
ed developing the region to feed its industrialization (Emmerson 2010: 17-18, 23, 43, 48). 
The region, previously considered as inaccessible and irrelevant, began to gain more strategic 
importance during the Second World War as battles were fought on the northwest borders of 
Soviet Union. After the war, by 1950, the Soviet Union and the US with its allies controlled 
the entire coastline of the Arctic Ocean making the region one of the principle arenas of Cold 
War.  Tension  grew  on  the  opposite  sides  of  the  ocean  while  nuclear  submarines  and  inter-
continental ballistics were obtained and the North Pole was reached above and below the 
ice23. (Ibid.: 122, 127-128, 130-131.)  
 
In 1987 Mikhail Gorbachev, then the head of state in the Soviet Union, held his famous 
speech pleading for the North Pole to become “a pole of peace” and urging cooperation be-
tween the Arctic countries for instance on environmental issues as well as in developing the 
Arctic resources (Ibid.:  135). As the Cold War turned toward its end, the strategic signifi-
cance of the Arctic declined and the region became a more cooperative geopolitical arena 
(Young 2009a: 426-427; Emmerson 2010: 136). However, there are many observations of an 
ongoing remilitarization in the Arctic as a result of the growing interest in the new resources 
(see e.g. Blunden 2009; Emmerson 2010: 141; Smith 2011: 187), which has also been noted 
by the media24. As Young (2009b: 73) puts it, the interpretation of the situation in the Arctic 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????23?While Soviet pilots had landed on the North Pole already in 1937, the American submarine USS Nautilus was 
the first ship to reach the pole under the ice in 1959, followed by Russian ice breaker Arktika in 1977 as the first 
surface ship in the North Pole (Emmerson 2010: 66, 123, 131).?24?The Guardian for instance wrote in 2008 of the threats of militarizing the Arctic in an article titled “A very 
cold war indeed (see Burgeman 2008).?
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has nonetheless been often “more alarmist than alarming” and a future military conflict is not 
considered likely (Emmerson 2010: 143; Smith 2011: 189). 
 
 
The main reasons for this are the remaining spirit of cooperation, accomplished inter alia in 
the form of the Arctic Council25 and  the  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Law of  the  Sea  
(UNCLOS), which has been the most important existing legal framework for the Arctic since 
1994 (Young 2009a: 435; Smith 2011: 189). UNCLOS sets limits to coastal state’s territorial 
sea defining also terms inter alia for the protection of the marine environment, freedom of 
navigation, resource management, and research 26  (Young 2009a: 435). In addition to 
UNCLOS, there are several other conventions, treaties and agreements applying to the Arctic 
(See Hoel 2009: 446-448), including environmental conventions such as the Arctic environ-
mental Protection Strategy that has been signed by all of the circumpolar states (Smith 2011: 
342). There is a debate on whether there should be an additional legal agreement solely tai-
lored for the Arctic but it is not supported by the Arctic five nor would it be easily adopted or 
shaped according to the changing conditions (Young 2009a: 438-439).  
?
While the Arctic is undergoing a change, so is the policy discourse regarding the region. Ac-
cording to Young (2009a), there are particularly two discourses, namely the “discourse of 
geopolitics/political realism” and the “discourse of ecosystem-based management” that are 
competing for dominance in the public discussion. Although Young admits that the two dis-
courses are not compatible with each other, nor likely to triumph over one another in the near 
future, they do summarize the ongoing discussion on the Arctic (Ibid.: 434). 
 
The discourse of geopolitical/political realism predicts jurisdictional claims, remilitarization 
and competition over the Arctic resources that are likely to lead to more or less serious con-
flicts. The parties of this struggle for power will not solely be powerful states, including inter 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????25?The Arctic Council was created in 1996 by the eight Arctic states as a soft-law institution for high-level dis-
cussions and for advising the member states (Dittmer et al. 2011, 208; Young 2009b, 79). While the Arctic eight 
are the member states of the Arctic Council, there are also other states, intergovernmental, inter-parliamentary 
and non-governmental organizations as participants with an observer status. The observers will, for instance, 
have the possibility to participate at the meetings of the Arctic Council where they may make statements under 
certain conditions (Arctic Council 2011). Along with the European Commission, inter alia Italy, China and 
South Korea all have applied for a permanent observer status without being granted one (Blunden 2009: 135; 
Dittmer et al. 2011: 210).?26?Coastal state has sovereign rights to the sea and seabed 12 nautical miles from its coastline and limited rights 
to its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extending 200 nautical miles from the coastline. Beyond this, a state is 
entitled to the seabed which is demonstrated to be the natural continuation of its continental shelf. (Emmerson 
2010: 110, 113.)?
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alia China, Japan and the EU, but multilateral corporations as well. (Ibid.: 432, 434.) The dis-
course of ecosystem-based management, on the other hand, seeks to provide sound and coop-
erative management practices for the Arctic. The basis of the discourse is the idea of the Arc-
tic as, like Young describes it, “a complex dynamic socio-ecological system” that is prone to 
various non-linear changes. The discourse suggests that the focus should be on the complex 
linkages between human activities and biophysical forces and a cooperative policy should be 
increased in order to gain sustainable development. (Young 2009a: 432-434.)  
 
 
1.5 Literature review 
 
 
The new situation in the North raises not only geopolitical but also environmental questions 
that have to be solved in order to preserve the region’s biodiversity, to ensure the sustainable 
use of the resources as well  as to prevent geopolitical  conflicts.  The ongoing changes in the 
Arctic region have indeed inspired scientists over the past years and a great deal of books and 
scientific articles have been published. They have inter alia addressed the region’s special 
features and the threats of climate change to the Arctic ecosystem, as well as the geopolitical 
questions in the region27. The International Polar Year that occurred in 2007-2009 consisted 
of some 200 projects thus contributing significantly to Arctic research (Hoel 2009: 450).  
 
Concerning the EU’s involvement in the Arctic region, there are many publications about the 
Northern Dimension policy, Arter’s article being a good example (Arter 2000). However, this 
theme is not in the focus of this study and thus will  not be further discussed here.  There are 
some publications regarding the EU’s actual Arctic policy although so far they are few, most 
likely because of the novelty of this specific policy domain. The general focus of the articles 
is also more on foreign and security policy as well as on energy policy rather than on envi-
ronmental issues like in this study.  
 
Additionally, their focus is more on the question of why the EU is developing Arctic policy, 
and not on how the EU perceives the Arctic. Indeed, Østhagen (2011) and Hossain (2010) 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????27?See?e.g.???Naturalist's?Guide?to?the?Arctic?by?E.?C.?Pielou?(1995),?After?the?Ice:?Life,?Death,?and?Geopolitics?in?the?New?Arctic?by?A.?Anderson?(2009)?or?Who?Owns?the?Arctic?:?Understanding?Sovereignty?Disputes?in?the?North?by?M.?Byers?(2010).?
27?
?
analyze the EU’s motives in detail. According to Hossain (Ibid.:  295), the main reason for 
EU’s involvement in the Arctic issues is the growing demand of fossil fuel –based energy 
within the EU. While the majority of these energy resources are imported from the northern 
parts of Russia and Norway, the EU has felt responsible for the environmental impacts that 
the extraction of these resources is having on the Arctic environment thus seeing it important 
to urge the implementation of high environmental standards by all stakeholders. As 78 per-
cent of the Russian oil is exported to European Union countries, Hossain points out that Rus-
sia is very dependent on the EU which creates a good position for the Union to issue demands 
on these standards (Hossain 2010: 295, 301, 303).  
 
Offerdal (2010) has also the energy viewpoint as central in his article, which focuses on the 
adoption of the High North strategy and how Norway has been able to promote the strategy to 
be taken as a part of EU policies. Arctic policy is a matter of energy security as EU becomes 
more and more dependent on external energy resources. Thus Norway has tried to highlight 
itself as a secure energy supplier. However, according to Offerdal, the interest towards Nor-
wegian High North seems quite small within the EU. The EU has not been able to decide on 
the contents of its own Arctic policy nor under which policy to locate it. Offerdal predicts that 
the Arctic policy will focus more on climate change and environmental issues than energy 
policy. (Ibid.: 32, 35-37.) Commenting on EU’s Arctic policy more recently, Offerdal has 
remarked that EU has become more aware of its interests in the region and is aiming to step 
up its engagement in Arctic affairs (Offerdal 2012). 
 
Østhagen in turn argues that the explanation for why EU started to develop an Arctic policy 
may be found in theories of world politics, such as neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism 
and institutionalism. However, as Østhagen uses these theories to specifically explain why the 
EU has developed an Arctic policy instead of explaining the policy’s contents, these theories 
will not be introduced here. Østhagen (2011) sees the European Commission’s need to estab-
lish its own importance and legitimacy as the main reason for the EU to develop a policy for 
the Arctic region.  By increasing its activities in the Arctic, the Commission can gain interna-
tional expertiese and recognition that will be beneficial in other arenas as well. Østhagen 
states that the EU has an additional need to keep on expanding its horizons which has to been 
done by developing Arctic policy as there are few options left for the traditional geographical 
expansion. Thus the EU has been creating an image of the Arctic as an unstable region where 
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the Union may offer its indispensable help in solving especially the environmental problems. 
(Ibid.: 17-18, 22-24.) 
 
As  closely  connected  with  the  EU Arctic  Forum (see  chapter  1.3),  Weber  and  Romanyshyn 
(2011: 860) don’t question EU’s legitimacy but see great potential in the EU’s involvement. 
However they urge better inter-institutional coordination to achieve a holistic policy and high-
light the importance of integrating the Arctic issues into wider the EU policies. Weber and 
Romanyshyn (2011) argue that the main trigger for the launching of the Arctic policy for EU 
has been the dramatic rise in global warming on one hand and the general objective to set up a 
more ambitious foreign policy for the Union.  (Ibid.: 850-851, 860.) The focus has turned to 
the former one as, according to Weber and Romanyshyn (Ibid.: 853, 857), the Commission 
has drawn more attention to ‘low’ politics such as environment or indigenous peoples, rather 
than to ‘high’ politics, such as energy, trade or security.  
 
These articles from Østhagen, Weber and Romanyshyn, Hossain, and Offerdal are the only 
ones so far that have been written exclusively on EU’s Arctic policy and published in scien-
tific journals. There are also extensive reports on the same theme published by the Nordic 
Council of Ministers and Fridtjof Nansen Institute, written by Airoldi (2008; 2010) and 
Grindheim (2009) respectively.  
 
Airoldi  has  written  two  comprehensive  reviews  of  the  EU’s  Arctic  policy  for  the  Nordic  
Council of Ministers. The first one, published in 2008, was an overview of the policy devel-
opment process including also estimation on how EU’s environmental policies may affect the 
Arctic region (Airoldi 2008: 7, 59-69). The report has a practical rather than a theoretical ap-
proach considering how the EU has affected the Arctic region. Airoldi’s second publication 
two years later updated the previous report describing the relevant EU documents that had 
thus far been published reviewing the development of the main EU policy sectors relevant to 
Arctic region (Airoldi 2010: 7). According to Airoldi (2008: 103; 2010: 60), EU’s activities 
have significant relevance to the Arctic in such fields as environmental policy where consid-
eration of Arctic issues has lately been particularly encouraged. However, Airoldi (2010: 10, 
59) notes that the EU still has a great challenge in gaining acceptance as an Arctic actor and it 
has to defend its presence and legitimacy by showing its expertiese in solving the Arctic prob-
lems. 
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For her part, Grindheim conducted a discourse analysis in 2009 on the ways in which the EU 
and Norway discuss and present climate and energy in their Arctic strategies and how these 
issues are related to a security framework. The approach thus has similarities to this study 
although, unlike this study, it compares two actors and focuses on the security aspect. Grind-
heim finds that the EU perceives the Arctic as its “energy province” although the arguments 
for resource extraction are wrapped in such arguments as sustainable development. Arctic 
climate change on the other hand is seen as a threat for Europe’s security, which affects the 
course of action that the EU wishes to take. (Grindheim 2009: 44.) According to Grindheim 
(Ibid.:  31), the EU has stressed its own significance in global efforts making it thus hard to be 
excluded from the discussions about Arctic climate. The EU has also justified its involvement 
with its security interests as the Arctic climate change has the potential to influence negatively 
on Europe’s security. (Ibid.: 34, 39.) 
 
As this short review shows, there are but a few relevant publications concerning this study 
which for the most part concentrate on the question of why the Arctic policy has been devel-
oped in the European Union. There is thus a need to consider the content of the policy in more 
detail especially from the environmental point of view, which has not yet been thoroughly 
covered by any of the scholars.  
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2 MATERIAL AND METHODS 
 
?
2.1 EU documents as data 
 
 
Texts do not solely describe what is going on but also create a certain version of the phenom-
enon. Language thus produces social reality while itself also being a product of it. (Eskola & 
Suoranta 2008, 140.) According to Jensen & Skedsmo (2010: 439), it is ultimately through 
language that we understand, construct and make sense of the world. The documents that the 
European Union has released relating to the Arctic construct a version of the region and of the 
situation associated to the ongoing changes. They reveal the EU’s insight on these matters and 
its view on how different aspects should be prioritized. This is why it is justified to use the 
documents as material when doing research on the development and content of an EU Arctic 
policy. Although other types of data might be used as well, such as interviews of officials and 
experts, the official documents give a perspective, on the one hand, of how the three institu-
tions  of  the  EU  have  wanted  to  formulate  its  policy  and  communicate  it  to  the  rest  of  the  
world and, on the other hand, of how the policy has evolved and to what direction it is cur-
rently headed. 
 
The development and content of the European Union’s Arctic policy is best visible in the of-
ficial documents released by its institutions and therefore I decided to use these documents as 
the data of my thesis. This approach has also been used by other researchers, such as Østha-
gen (2011) and Offerdal (2010).  The documents, for the most part introduced in chapter 1.3, 
include several types of papers. Communications are a way for the Commission to express its 
view on a certain subject and they usually contain suggestions for action. (Airoldi 2010: 20). 
Council  conclusions  in  turn  express  the  unanimous  views  of  all  Member  States  often  estab-
lishing the basis for further action. Neither of these documents are legally binding. Nor are the 
European Parliament resolutions or motions for resolutions, which aim at giving impetus for 
the policy-making process. (Ibid.: 19-20, 22.) The resolutions are or are not adopted after they 
have been debated and voted on by the Parliament. In addition, the Parliament has the possi-
bility to give the impetus by debating current topics or asking the Commission questions oral-
ly or in writing. (Bomberg et al. 2012: 64, 125.) 
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The documents exist regardless of the researcher or the study and are therefore called natural-
ly occurring data (Alasuutari 2001: 84). I started the analyzing process with important docu-
ments, which had been analyzed by other scholars thus being established as significant in 
terms of the EU’s Arctic policy. These documents included the communication of the Com-
mission on The European Union and the Arctic region28, Council conclusions on Arctic is-
sues29 and the Parliament’s resolution on a sustainable EU policy for the High North30. These 
documents include several references to other EU documents that I also included in my analy-
sis as long as they were relevant in terms of Arctic policy.  
 
As I moved forward with the analysis of the data gathered so far, I found it necessary to make 
a full search of all relevant documents in order to get a broad picture of the development of 
this policy area as well as gaining as much information as possible on the various environ-
mental aspects emerging from the data. As there is a comprehensive supply of all EU docu-
ments on the Internet, I conducted thorough searches of the documents released by the Euro-
pean Commission31, European Parliament32 and the Council of the European Union33 on each 
of their  webpages.  Additionally,  I  conducted a search on EUR-Lex34, which is a database of 
European Union law.  
 
These searches provided me with a wide range of documents from which I selected those that 
were relevant in terms of my research questions. In other words, I included to my analysis the 
documents that defined the EU’s position in Arctic matters or that addressed environmental 
policy in the Arctic region. The documents that were excluded mentioned the Arctic in anoth-
er context, for instance in energy policy, transport and logistics, agriculture or research. Also 
certain documents that related to the research questions only partially, like the documents 
regarding the potential accession of Iceland to the European Union, I decided to exclude at the 
end, as I already considered the data saturated.  
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????28?COM(2008)763 final?29?16857/09?30?P7_TA(2011)0024?31?http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm (Arctic policy to be found under Maritime Affairs)?32?http://www.europarl.europa.eu/portal/en) (Parliamentary terms 2004-2009 and 2009-2014)?33?http://www.consilium.europa.eu/homepage?lang=en?34?http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm?
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After gathering a comprehensive group of these milestone documents, I considered it im-
portant to widen the spectrum further around them. I thus conducted a search also on Rapid35, 
which is a database of press releases, memos and speeches released by different institutions 
and officials within the EU. This search was done with the same terms as the previous ones 
resulting  to  a  set  of  additional  pieces  of  data  complementing  the  milestone  documents.  The  
speeches, along with the Parliament debates and explanations of vote, give a personal touch to 
the data as the speakers express their personal views, although following to some extent the 
common status of their institutions or parties. This gives a nice variation to the data otherwise 
consisting of more impersonal statements. 
 
I gathered the data during the first half of 2012, making the last searches on July 5th and after 
completing all of the above stages, I considered the data saturated. This is a stage where cer-
tain discourses start to be repeated and relevant data no longer seems to emerge (Eskola & 
Suoranta 2008: 63; Strauss & Corbin 1998: 212). I also considered the data to be representa-
tive in terms of containing a diverse range of documents. The documents were released by all 
three  EU institutions  as  well  as  the  High  Representative  within  the  six  past  years,  the  most  
recent ones just days before starting my analysis. The data could have been considered satu-
rated even earlier but I decided to include to the study all of the documents I considered rele-
vant in terms of the development of the EU Arctic policy. The reason for this was the aim to 
use all the documents in writing the description of the development of EU’s Arctic policy (see 
chapter 1.3) as well as gaining material for the quantitative part of my analysis. 
 
All in all the process resulted in 40 documents that, taken together, have the total of 184 pag-
es. In addition to the milestone documents, the data include speeches, press releases, memos, 
Parliament debates and explanations of vote, as well as written questions of members of the 
Parliament and the Commissions representatives’ answers to them. The data include eleven 
documents from the Commission, eleven from the Parliament, two from the Council and four 
from the High Representative. There are also twelve documents jointly released by several 
institutions, most of which are the Parliament questions combined with the Commission an-
swers. The documents have been released between 2007 and 2012 and since 2008 there has 
been a fairly constant amount of the documents released, around seven or eight per year. A 
full list of all of these documents analyzed in this study is presented in appendix I. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????35?http://europa.eu/rapid/?
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2.2 Combining qualitative and quantitative analysis 
 
 
As  the  data  of  this  thesis  consists  of  written  documents36 and as the nature of my research 
questions are descriptive rather than quantifying, it felt natural to me to choose a qualitative 
method for the analysis of the data. As pointed out by Eskola & Suoranta (2008: 137), the 
purpose of analyzing data in a qualitative way is to clarify it thus gaining information on the 
issue that is being studied. Along with Eskola & Suoranta (Ibid.: 61), Strauss & Corbin (1998: 
10-12, 25) define qualitative research as a type of research, which does not aim for statistical 
generalization. Instead, the aim is to discover concepts and relationships in the data by reduc-
ing it and elaborating and relating the emerging categories according to their properties and 
dimensions. These processes, often referred as coding, aim for organizing the concepts into a 
theory (Strauss & Corbin 1998: 11-12). This type of definition of qualitative research is 
shared by Alasuutari (2001: 40-50), who’s perception of qualitative research includes produc-
ing the observations, i.e. coding, reducing the observations by combining them into groups, 
and finally interpreting the results of the process.   
 
In addition to qualitative research, there is also a quantitative dimension to this study.  Ac-
cording to Alasuutari (2001: 32) and Strauss & Corbin (1998: 31), qualitative and quantitative 
analysis may well be applied in various ways and combinations to the same study and data. 
One way is to quantify qualitative data by gathering and coding qualitative data in such a way 
that enables a quantitative analysis to be conducted for background information while keeping 
the main part of the analysis qualitative and interpretative (Strauss & Corbin 1998: 11). While 
applying the method of open coding (see chapter 2.2.2) to my data, I was interested in seeing 
whether there were some concepts that emerged more often than others. This would give the 
analysis more depth, as it would indicate the priorities of the European Union while develop-
ing an Arctic policy, denoting the further importance of the concepts and categories. In other 
words, the quantitative data would give a rough idea of ‘what’s really going on’ in the data. 
At best this would have the potential of indicating the importance of the environmental aspect 
in relation to the other concepts addressed in the documents, which was one of my goals in 
conducting this study. 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????36?Technically speaking, the Parliament debates are actually oral statements that have been transcribed.?
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As I carefully went through the data document by document, writing down all the concepts 
that emerged, I simultaneously marked down under each concept the number of times it 
emerged from the document. I then gathered this information by year so that I got the fre-
quencies for each concept per annum from 2007 to 2012. These numbers are not statistically 
valid for a number of reasons. First of all, they are based on concepts that are my interpreta-
tion of the documents and it could thus be possible for another researcher to end up with 
slightly different frequencies. Secondly, there has been a variable number of documents each 
year and although the number of pages per annum has been approximately 30, there was al-
most double that number of pages in 2012 already during the first half of the year.  
 
Thirdly, the frequencies for 2012 are not directly comparable to the earlier years as the data 
does not cover the whole year and it is expected that more documents will be released during 
the latter part of the year. Fourthly, the frequencies depend on the types of documents re-
leased. The frequency increases if there has been a Parliament debate during the year as some 
of the concepts are mentioned more often as they come up time and time again in the state-
ments of various Members of Parliament. Although it could have been possible to divide the 
frequencies of the concepts by the page numbers of the documents each year, I did not con-
sider it to be well-grounded for the two latter reasons. 
 
This said, the frequencies give a valid general conception of which concepts come up in the 
documents and which are less often mentioned, denoting for their part what the documents are 
really about. The frequencies for the concepts are shown in a descendent order for the years 
2008 and 2012 in appendix x. These two years are selected for their significance in the devel-
opment of EU’s Arctic policy because fundamental Commission conclusions have then been 
published setting the direction for the policy development. Comparing these years gives a 
general view of which direction the Arctic policy of the EU is headed. For comparison, the 
appendix shows also the frequencies for all the years (2007-2012) combined in a descendent 
order. Due to the limitations of this quantitative approach, I will not refer to the exact fre-
quencies in my analysis but only to general ideas of the prominence of the concepts. 
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2.2.1 Grounded Theory 
 
 
The principal approach to this study however remains qualitative and I have chosen Grounded 
theory as a method for it, as presented by Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin in 1998. Ground-
ed theory is a method where data collection, analysis and theory building are in close relation 
to each other and the different stages are not often possible to be clearly separated. The idea 
of the method is to ground concepts and thus analysis in the data allowing the theory to 
emerge there rather than beginning the project with a preconceived theory in mind. The pur-
pose is thus building theory rather than testing a pre-existing one, which in turn would be 
done in a deductive, theory-based method. (Tuomi & Saarijärvi 2002: 95-99; Strauss & 
Corbin 1998: 12-13.) This kind of a division is of course somewhat arbitrary as researchers 
are nonetheless imprisoned to a certain extent of their own culture.  The emerging theory thus 
largely adheres to the framework of the existing research traditions.  
 
An inductive method then offered by the Grounded theory is, in my opinion, ideal in my re-
search. Since development of the EU’s Arctic policy and especially its environmental aspect 
is little studied, there isn’t really a theory that would unambiguously define the phenomenon. 
Hence, there is not an obvious possibility to develop a hypothesis and test it through this 
study. The Grounded theory thus presents a fine opportunity as a method to construct a theory 
of ‘what’s going on’ in this specific field of study. There are three stages in Strauss and 
Corbin’s Grounded theory, namely open, axial and selective coding that aim at theoretical 
sampling. These coding processes, include a careful analysis of the data in order to find con-
cepts that are further categorized and analyzed by making questions and comparisons. The 
categories, i.e. phenomena, that emerge are foundations for developing theory and are there-
fore carefully examined in terms of their  properties and dimensions as well  as for how they 
relate to each other. The process of developing and densifying categories will continue until 
theoretical saturation is reached. This is a point where the categories are well developed and 
no new properties, dimensions or relationships emerge during analysis. (Strauss & Corbin 
1998: 66, 89-94, 143, 202-203.)  
 
Next, the processes of open, axial and selective coding are explained more thoroughly. While 
I aspired for objectivity when going through the coding process, it is important to note, as 
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Strauss & Corbin (Strauss & Corbin 1998: 43, 136) remind, that the process is based on the 
researcher’s interpretations thus inevitably affected by his or her values, experiences and cul-
tural norms. 
 
 
2.2.2 Open coding 
 
 
According to Strauss & Corbin (Strauss & Corbin 1998: 101), open coding is an analytical 
process with the purpose of discovering concepts in the data and identifying their properties 
and dimensions. Strauss & Corbin define properties as the general or specific characteristics 
or attributes of a concept or a category, while dimensions are defined to represent “the loca-
tion of a property along a continuum of range” (Ibid.: 116).  
 
The first step in open coding is finding these concepts that may be seen as important in the 
data. Dozens of concepts may be found as at first the researcher is open to all possibilities, 
hence the name open coding (Ibid.: 113, 206). The process requires the researcher to be able 
to group similar objects under a common classification and is naturally subject to interpreta-
tions that the researcher makes regarding the attributes of the objects. (Ibid.:  103-105.) There 
are several ways of carrying out open coding, one of them being line-by-line analysis. In this 
type of microanalysis, the data are examined and interpreted very thoroughly, going through 
the documents line by line and concentrating on the words and phrases used in the text (Ibid.: 
58, 119). The basis of such microanalysis is, as Strauss & Corbin (Ibid.: 65) put it, listening to 
what is said and how, allowing the data to speak.  
 
This is what I kept in mind when starting with the line-by-line analysis. Going through the 
data that I had collected so far, I marked down the concepts as they emerged from the docu-
ments. I named and labeled the concepts, according to Strauss & Corbin’s instructions (Ibid.:  
105-106), with a name that would represent the variety of objects included in the concept. I 
constructed and named most of the concepts conceptualizing and interpreting the text. How-
ever, some in-vivo codes, i.e. objects taken straight from the documents, were included as 
well. Examples of the types of names are “unspoiled wilderness”, “race for resources”, “high 
time for action” and “cultural schizophrenia”.  
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When beginning with the line-by-line analysis, I quickly noticed that, as Strauss & Corbin 
had anticipated, dozens of concepts started to arise. When conceptualizing and interpreting 
the data I carefully thought about the meaning of each word and phrase in the documents 
identifying its properties and dimensions. Comparing the concepts to each other and grouping 
them this way by finding their similarities and differences is also the basis for theoretical 
sampling in the method of Grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin 1998: 207). Through this pro-
cess I was able to find out whether or not the word or phrase was relevant in respect to my 
research  questions  and  under  which  concept  it  would  be  the  best  fit.  In  some cases  I  had  to  
exclude whole paragraphs that I considered irrelevant, such as detailed descriptions of specif-
ic research programs in the Arctic conducted or funded by the EU. Additionally, in some cas-
es I ended up coding only parts of the document, as there were only some relevant paragraphs, 
which however seemed too important to be excluded from the data completely. An example 
of this is the document Climate Change and International Security37, where I only coded 
chapter III-6 and conclusions.  
 
At the end of the analyzing process, I had ended up with 165 concepts. However, when again 
comparing these with each other and thinking about the properties and dimensions of the con-
cepts, I saw it justifiable to combine some of them. Examples of these combinations would 
have been a pair of phrases such as fragile/vulnerable (when describing the Arctic environ-
ment), sustainability/sustainable development and environmental impacts of the use of arctic 
resources/impacts of use on biodiversity. After this process there were 106 concepts remain-
ing to be further analyzed (see appendix II for a full list of the concepts). 
 
The next stage in open coding is grouping the concepts into categories to stand for phenome-
na. According to Strauss & Corbin (1998: 113-114), these phenomena in turn have the capaci-
ty to answer the paramount question of the analysis, which is “What’s going on here?” This 
question is a tool in all of the three phases to determine the essence of the concepts and cate-
gories thus slowly constructing a theory of what the data is really about in in relation to one’s 
research questions. 
 
Categories have properties that may be identified by looking for their general or specific char-
acteristics or attributes. Furthermore, the properties have several dimensions and by identify-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????37?European Commission and… 2008?
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ing how the properties vary along their dimensional ranges will create variation into the cate-
gory.  These processes will enable the researcher to group the data according to certain pat-
terns that are formed when groups of properties align themselves along various dimensions. 
(Strauss & Corbin 1998: 116-118.) Making questions and comparisons while grouping the 
concepts is an important tool as it helps to identify the properties and dimensions of the con-
cepts thus creating means for grouping and identifying the essence of the categories (Ibid.: 
76-77, 89-90).  
 
Based  on  the  106  concepts  I  derived  from the  data,  I  was  able  to  find  six  categories,  that  I  
named as Changes in the unique Arctic, Emerging Arctic resources and new navigation 
routes, Geopolitical change and implications for global security, The governance of the Arc-
tic, EU as a key actor in the Arctic, and Protection of the Arctic environment. These catego-
ries were fairly easily defined based on the properties and dimensions of the concepts. I saw a 
clear pattern for instance regarding the category of emerging Arctic resources and new navi-
gation routes. Each concept in this category clearly indicates these emerging opportunities 
that are to be taken advantage of. As Strauss & Corbin (1998: 118) note however, each one of 
the concepts is not going to be a perfect fit to the pattern but this is acceptable within limits. I 
also experienced this dilemma regarding some concepts that could have been placed under 
several categories. In these cases I looked more carefully at their properties and placed the 
concept under the category that had the most similar characteristics.  
 
Strauss & Corbin point out (Ibid.: 114) that the categories may be further differentiated by 
breaking them down into subcategories. Most of the categories included a variety of concepts 
that  clearly,  on  the  basis  of  their  properties,  formed such  patterns  that  they  could  be  further  
categorized. In my opinion, the derived subcategories also form a clear pattern in relation to 
the main category. All of the six categories along with their subcategories are shown in table 
1. 
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Table?1:?Categories?and?subcategories?
 
 
 
2.2.3 Axial and selective coding 
 
 
After conducting open coding, and partially already during it, the analysis continued with 
axial coding. Strauss & Corbin (1998:124) define axial coding as a process where categories, 
are related to their subcategories thus exploring the relationship of categories and making 
connections between them. In order to further analyze the categories, each of which actually 
denoting a phenomenon, their properties and dimensions are to be recognized in the same 
manner as concepts were defined during open coding. Furthermore, three aspects of the phe-
nomena, namely conditions, actions/interactions and consequences, are identified. Conditions 
are events and incidents that influence the phenomenon and create the situation where action 
or interaction takes place. Actions and interactions are routine responses to these events, fol-
lowed by the consequences, which are the outcomes or results. This process of axial coding is 
done in order to gain an understanding of the phenomena. (Ibid.: 126, 128-130.) 
 
Category Subcategories 
Changes in the unique Arctic Fragile wilderness 
Diverse changes 
Reducing climate change 
Emerging Arctic resources and new  
navigation routes 
Variety of new resources 
Emerging maritime routes 
Environmental impacts 
Geopolitical change and implications for  
global security 
Race for resources 
Cooperative approach 
The governance of the Arctic Existing legal framework 
Options for governance 
EU as a key actor in the Arctic Grounds for EU’s legitimacy on the Arctic 
EU has much to offer 
EU’s interests towards the Arctic 
EU’s responsibilities in the Arctic 
Arctic policy of the EU 
Criticism towards EU policies 
Protection of the Arctic environment Protecting and preserving 
Prudent activities 
Sustainable development 
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These three aspects form the basic components of the perspective that was taken towards the 
data. This perspective, the paradigm as Strauss & Corbin call it, starts from uncovering rela-
tionships between categories. It aims at integrating structure (the underlying conditions) with 
process (subsequent action), thus contextualizing the phenomenon. (Strauss & Corbin 1998: 
128). The variations inside categories as well as between them are uncovered through these 
processes and the categories are thus well developed for their properties and dimensions. This 
contributes to the theoretical sampling that began during open coding and so it should be car-
ried  out  until  the  categories  are  saturated,  or  words  to  the  point  where  no  new  information  
seems to emerge. (Ibid.: 22, 136, 210-211.) 
 
The final step of the three-phased analysis is selective coding. It is a process where the cate-
gories that were identified and defined in axial coding are integrated through selecting and 
analyzing a central category. The central category should represent the main theme of the 
research and be able to connect all the other categories by relating itself to them. (Ibid.: 143, 
146-147.) Like the other categories, the central category must be defined in terms of its prop-
erties and dimensions. However, it will be further developed and as a method of analysis in 
the selective coding process, Strauss & Corbin (1998: 148-149) suggest writing a storyline to 
define the essence of the central category. The storyline should include not only the careful 
definition of the category but also the recognition of the linkages to the other categories. This 
storyline can be found throughout the discussion in chapter 4. From a theoretical point of 
view, selective coding involves discriminate theoretical sampling where only the essential 
concepts regarding the central category will become part of the theory (Ibid.: 211-212). 
 
As the idea of this thesis is to study not only the development of an EU Arctic policy but also 
specifically the environmental aspect of the policy, choosing the “Protection of the Arctic 
environment” as the central category is natural and justifiable. This category is well repre-
sented in the data, which is also demonstrated by the frequency in which the concepts of the 
category emerge in the documents (see concept VI in appendix II). Additionally, there are 
clear connections to be found between the central category and the other five categories thus 
allowing it to be scrutinized in a wide context. 
 
In accordance with these guidelines, I will take a closer look at five of the categories in chap-
ter 4.1. It is good to note that the categories are not general facts or emphasis on what is hap-
pening in the Arctic, but rather a description of the events from the EU’s point of view. Also, 
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although I have interpreted the conditions for the phenomena from a wider perspective, the 
actions or interactions as well as the consequences are discussed from the EU’s point of view 
so that they appear to have arisen from the data. The sixth category, i.e. the central category, 
will be discussed separately in chapter 4.2 although, as strongly urged by Strauss & Corbin, 
the comparisons between all of the six categories will be made throughout both of these chap-
ters. 
  
42?
?
3 ANALYSIS 
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3.1 Changes in the unique Arctic 
 
 
Change in the unique Arctic is a phenomenon describing the significant changes that are cur-
rently happening in the vulnerable Arctic region and also those changes anticipated to happen 
in the future. The name of the category itself reveals the two dimensions, also shown as sub-
categories, as being the fragility of the unique environment on the one hand, and the diversity 
of  the  ongoing  change  on  the  other.  The  fragility  or  vulnerability  of  the  Arctic  come out  in  
various statements throughout the data, stated for instance by MEP Avril Doyle as a “highly 
fragile and vulnerable ecosystem” (European Parliament 2008a) or by MEP Godfrey Bloom 
as “one of the last wildernesses in the world” (European Parliament 2009b). The Commission 
stated  in  2008  that  ”the  Arctic  remains  one  of  the  most  pristine  areas  on  Earth”  (European  
Commission 2008: 2).  
 
The changes range from environmental change caused by non-greenhouse gas pollution to 
climate change and its various environmental impacts, to also social change. The European 
Parliament noted in 2008 that “the rate of global warming in the Arctic region is much higher 
than in the rest of the world” (European Parliament 2008b). The EU has been concerned about 
the situation, which is very obvious for instance when Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Member of 
the  Commission,  stated  in  2009  that  “The  radical  transformation  of  the  Arctic  is  having  an  
impact on its people, its landscape and its wildlife – on land and at sea” (European Parliament 
2009b). The perception of many Members of the Parliament is even more dramatic than this. 
As Tunne Kelam notes (European Parliament 2008a), “the region has entered a dramatic cli-
mate change--”, or Alojz Peterle states in the following year (European Parliament 2009b): 
“We are witnessing both natural and human crises taking place in the Arctic”.  
 
Additionally, there is a global dimension to the change, shown for instance in this statement 
by the Commission and High Representative Catherine Ashton:  
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Nowhere is climate change more visible than in the Arctic, which is a vital and vulner-
able component of the Earth’s environment and climate system (European Commission 
and… 2012a: 2).  
 
Moreover, the impact on Europe is also seen as inevitable. Alexandr Vondra, President –in-
Office of the Council pointed this out in 2009 when he stated ” It is not only the region itself 
which is likely to be affected but -- also the EU as a whole” (European Parliament 2009b).  
 
Climate change creates the main conditions for the change in the Arctic.  Thus this category 
also includes reduction of climate change as a subcategory, which, although not being a per-
fect fit to this category, is essential in terms of the volume of the anticipated future change. 
Generally speaking, global, social and economic structures have led to a situation where too 
much greenhouse gases are emitted compared to the capacity of the global carbon sinks. An-
other reason for the change is the fragility itself because the special features of the Arctic en-
vironment create opportunities for the change to happen. The climate change and the special 
features of the environment lead to certain actions, namely efforts of not only reducing the 
climate change and protecting the arctic environment, but also to taking advantage of the new 
opportunities created by the changing conditions.  
 
Research is also a type of action aiming not only for better understanding of the change and 
its environmental consequences but also understanding how to take advantage of the rising 
opportunities. These actions are further described under the other categories. In turn, the con-
sequences of these actions may be listed as race for resources, which is induced by the melt-
ing of the sea ice, enhancing environmental protection and cautious action due to the increas-
ing human activity in the area, as well as slowing down the climate change, assuming that the 
international climate negotiations will succeed. These concepts are also further discussed un-
der the other categories. 
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3.2 Emerging Arctic resources and new navigation routes 
 
 
The phenomenon of emerging resources and new navigation routes is significant not only in 
the data but also regarding the future of the Arctic. The properties of this phenomenon could 
be defined as the variety of emerging opportunities in terms of new possibilities to utilize the 
under-developed natural resources, navigation routes and potential for tourism while noting 
the environmental impacts caused by these actions. The latter aspect is not a perfect fit to this 
category. It is nevertheless inextricably linked to the resources and routes and therefore is a 
better fit here than in any other of the categories, because the last category will be specifically 
about environmental protection. It is also justifiable to categorize the environmental impacts 
under this category, since the concern for them is repeatedly mentioned in the data when the 
resources are discussed, as shown in the following examples by MEP Véronique De Keyser 
and MEP Liisa Jaakonsaari respectively:  
 
The melting of the ice will make it easier -- to exploit the vast oil and gas reserves and 
to open up a navigable waterway between the East and the West, which will save thou-
sands of kilometers for cargo ships but will unfortunately prove disastrous for the envi-
ronment. (European Parliament 2009b.) 
 
The Arctic treasure chest that is opening up is full of economic opportunities, but it 
poses many environmental and security risks, as well as those connected with the fate 
of the indigenous peoples. Global warming is opening up new sea routes and enabling 
the exploitation of oil and gas resources in an environmentally destructive way. -- Eu-
ropean Union must take urgent action and draw up its own Arctic policy. (European 
Parliament 2010a.)  
 
The variety of these environmental impacts as well as the variety of the emerging resources 
and maritime routes also create the subcategories for the phenomenon at hand. Again, the 
subcategories denote the dimensions for the category. The variety of the new resources in-
cludes a range of dimensions in itself as the resources vary from hydrocarbons to minerals 
and from renewable energy to prospects of tourism. These resources, along with the emerging 
maritime routes, have a huge variation in terms of when and where they may be exploited and 
how significant the prospects of the resources will turn out to be. For instance, there are sev-
eral different estimations in the data of the amount of the potential hydrocarbon reserves, de-
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fined as “large” by the Commission already in 2008 (European Commission 2008: 6). Per-
haps the most optimistic estimation however was presented by MEP Inese Vaidere in 2011, 
when she stated:   
 
--[I]t has to be recognized that using the riches of the Arctic can open new possibilities 
for resolving not only energy problems, but also raw material and food-related prob-
lems (European Parliament 2011b).  
 
The variation in the category also includes the different level of enthusiasm of various actors 
to take advantage of these resources. In addition, the environmental impacts caused by the 
increasing human activity are diverse and like the resources, their scope is more or less diffi-
cult to assess before they unfold.  
 
Regarding the conditions for the environmental impacts of the increasing human activity, the 
fragility of the environment as well as the increasing use itself may be seen as lying in the 
background. On the other hand, the conditions for the emerging resources and new routes are 
once again the climate change, but also increasing demand for affordable energy and other 
resources due to global population growth and the developing economies of certain countries 
like  China.  Like  MEP  Jaros?aw  Leszek  Wa??sa  points  out  in  the  Parliament  debate  on  EU  
policy on Arctic issues (European Parliament 2010a), “Development of international trade 
and increased need for natural resources has caused a growth in interest in the [Arctic] re-
gion”.   Intensifying globalization creates frames for the demand as, on the one hand, barriers 
for global trade have been reduced and, on the other hand, increasing trade requires new re-
sources and profitable transportation.  
 
Globalization can be seen as the dominant condition for tourism as well. As the world is get-
ting smaller, so to speak, for the growing number of people who already have seen it all, the 
Arctic appears as a new and exciting place to visit. Once again the romantic picture of the icy 
home of the polar pear emerges. Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council 
describes the situation in his speech in 2010: 
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Today, what a change: the legendary Northwest Passage is now open in August, and 
thanks to icebreakers, people can watch polar bears whilst wearing sunglasses sitting 
on their deck chairs! At least if one would believe these brochures… (Rompuy 2010.) 
 
The actions resulting from these conditions may be listed as research, race for resources and 
environmental protection. Presumably there is going to be increasing research and exploration 
of the amount and whereabouts of the arctic resources as well as of means to utilize them. On 
the other hand, some degree of a so called race for resources and increasing navigation may 
be expected as various actors have a growing need to have their share in the arctic develop-
ment. Finally, environmental protection is likely to be on the increase in terms of decreasing 
environmental threats due to increasing activity by, for instance, developing more environ-
mental  friendly  technology or  pursuing  even  a  50-year  moratorium for  the  use  of  the  arctic  
resources. The latter is suggested for instance by MEP Satu Hassi in the Parliament debate on 
EU policy on Arctic issues (European Parliament 2010a).  
 
The consequences of these actions are many. Finding profitable stocks of resources and 
means to utilize them, especially if the means are seen to be environmentally friendly, would 
plausibly lead to the extraction of these resources. In turn, this could lead to geopolitical 
changes as well as environmental threats and problems. Increasing activity in the Arctic could 
bring other interested actors to the region mixing up the geopolitical situation. Additionally, 
using the Arctic hydrocarbon resources would likely in time result in enhancing the climate 
change and accelerating the challenges and opportunities in the region. In respect to the bene-
fits of navigation, negative impacts might also arise, such as piracy and transportation of 
weapons, drugs or illegal immigrants (Blunden 2009: 124).  
 
 
3.3 Geopolitical change and implications for global security 
 
 
According to the data, the environmental changes and emerging resources are leading to geo-
political changes in the Arctic that have the potential to cause threats to global security. This 
phenomenon creates the third category for this study. Along the lines to what had been stated 
by High Representative in Climate Change and International Security (European Commission 
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and…  2008:  8),  the  Commission  stated  already  in  its  first  conclusions  regarding  the  Arctic  
that: 
 
--[E]nvironmental changes are altering the geo-strategic dynamics of the Arctic with 
potential consequences for international stability and European security interests call-
ing for the development of an EU Arctic policy. (European Commission 2008: 2.) 
 
The subcategories of this category represent the two dimensions of the phenomenon, namely 
race for resources on the one hand, and cooperative approach on the other. These dimensions 
are well expressed by the Parliament, whose outlook on the issue had undergone a change in 
2011, compared to its statement in 2008:  
 
[The European Parliament] [r]emains particularly concerned over the ongoing race 
for natural resources in the Arctic, which may lead to security threats for the EU and 
overall international instability[.] (European Parliament 2008b.) 
 
[The European Parliament] [b]elieves that the impression given by some observers of a 
so-called scramble for the Arctic does not contribute to fostering a constructive under-
standing and cooperation in the region[.] (European Parliament 2011a.) 
 
The race for resources denotes the somewhat uncontrolled rush to the Arctic by the Arctic 
states, and possibly also other countries (e.g. China), institutions (e.g. the EU), multinational 
companies (e.g. oil companies) and other stakeholders (e.g. indigenous peoples and environ-
mental organizations). The motivation for the rush among these actors varies from interest in 
the resources to the need to ensure one’s sovereignty over the geographical regions or re-
sources to the wish to guarantee the wellbeing of the Arctic environment.  
 
The activities and interaction induced by these conditions vary according to the actor and de-
note the scale of intensity of the action. The actor may want to secure or highlight one’s sov-
ereignty over a specific region, or have one’s share in the resources, or the actor may want to 
do both. These actions and interactions may be achieved in a peaceful tone or lead to diplo-
matic issues. The consequences of these actions further represent the two dimensions. In some 
scenarios  there  could  be  border  disputes  to  some  extent,  and  even  militarization  and  global  
instability: 
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--[T]he existence of different jurisdictions in the Arctic region risks triggering major 
conflicts between countries wanting to protect, including by military means, what they 
consider to be their national interests[.] (European Parliament 2009a.)  
 
In other, more positive scenarios there could be cooperation and synergistic interaction 
amongst some or all actors who respect each other’s sovereignty and interests in the region. 
Environmental degradation may occur in both cases. 
 
The history of the Arctic creates the current geopolitical conditions for the region defining the 
borders of the eight countries. The existing governance and legal structure in the area, most 
importantly UNCLOS, further defines the extension of the Arctic five’s sovereignty over the 
Arctic Ocean.  The situation is not stagnate but sensitive to changes of national interests. The 
Arctic resources on the other hand create an essential condition for geopolitics too because 
national interests are altered according to whether or not economically and technically feasi-
ble resources will be found.  
 
 
3.4 The governance of the Arctic 
 
 
The  properties  of  the  Arctic  governance  system  (see  chapter  1.4)  might  be  characterized  as  
complex and subject to some level of change. The dimensions denoted by the subcategories of 
this phenomenon are the existing legal framework and options for future governance. As 
MEP Christian Rovising noted in 2009: 
 
In addition to UNCLOS, there are a large number of other relevant international and 
regional instruments. There is scarcely any need for more governance (European Par-
liament 2009b).  
 
The sheer number of the existing treaties and conventions applying to the region create a great 
variation in the governance regime, as do also the wide range of parties in this existing 
framework. Moreover, the interests of the parties and their interpretations of the treaties and 
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conventions, as well as their views of the sufficiency of the existing framework and possible 
needs for their future development vary amongst the parties. Having ratified UNCLOS, and 
several of the other conventions, and having security interests in the Arctic as a close neigh-
bor, one of these parties is the European Union. However, opinions of the sufficiency of the 
existing framework vary even inside the EU, between its institutions. In fact, the views vary 
even inside the Parliament. When comparing to the previous example, this comes out in the 
statements of MEPs Satu Hassi and Véronique De Keyser respectively: 
 
We badly need an international treaty on the management of the Arctic region, but its 
starting point and main goal must be conservation of the region --. (European Parlia-
ment 2008a).  
 
--[G]iven the implications for energy, the environment and military security, the Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea is not adequate for the Arctic (European Parliament 
2009b).  
 
The history of the Arctic region and the background of all the conventions applying to it, as 
well as the history of the Arctic Council, create conditions for the governance of the Arctic. 
The ongoing changes in the region also create conditions for the current situation where the 
sufficiency of the existing governance has been questioned and where the needs and interests 
of a variety of actors and parties must be considered. The conditions for the activities of the 
EU are built upon the principles of multilateralism and cooperation in the framework of the 
existing legal framework, as well as on its wish to be recognized as an important actor in the 
Arctic. As Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Member of the Commission explained in 2009: 
 
Rather than expanding efforts on that cause [a binding legal regime specifically de-
signed for the Arctic], the EU’s interests and objectives are better served by building 
greater multilateral cooperation and making better use of the existing legal instruments 
(European Parliament 2009b).  
 
These conditions have induced the EU to apply for a permanent observer status in the Arctic 
Council.  Indeed, the European Union has several times stated its support in “strengthening 
the legal and economic base” of the Arctic Council as the “primary competent body for cir-
cumpolar regional cooperation” (European Parliament 2011a; Council of the European Union 
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2009: 8). In addition, the EU has expressed its strong wish for a dialogue with a number of 
arctic stakeholders, most importantly with the Arctic five. This is shown in more detail when 
discussing the next concept of EU as a key actor in the Arctic. 
 
The consequences for these actions, denial of the observer status by the Arctic Council on one 
hand and increased cooperation with the Arctic states on the other, have led the EU to try 
even harder to establish a legitimate role for itself in the eyes of the Arctic stakeholders. The 
ever-enduring enthusiasm was only recently expressed by the Commission and the High Rep-
resentative Catherine Ashton:  
 
The European Union wants to engage more with Arctic partners to increase its awareness of 
their concerns and to address common challenges in a collaborative manner (European 
Commission and… 2012a: 3).  
 
 
3.5 EU as a key actor in the Arctic 
 
 
The phenomenon of the EU being a key actor in the Arctic includes the multiple activities it 
conducts on various fields of Arctic affairs as well as statements it makes on its role, forming 
the grounds for the EU to be considered as a legitimate and appreciated Arctic actor. This 
category is by far the most extensive compared to the other five and its properties have a wide 
range of dimensions. There are various ways in which the three EU institutions promote the 
legitimacy of the EU as an arctic actor, most importantly through the documents of the evolv-
ing Arctic policy.  
 
While the main argument being for instance geographical (see chapter 1.3), the argument of 
legitimacy  is  also  written  inside  a  variety  of  other  statements  ranging  from  EU’s  important  
role in combating climate change and conducting Arctic research, to the EU’s interests and 
responsibilities related to the Arctic. All of these are clearly stated already in the first Com-
munication of the Commission in 2008 (see European Commission 2008). The statement of 
High Representative Catherine Ashton in a Parliament debate in 2010 serves as an example of 
defining the EU as a key actor:  
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For my part, I think we have much to contribute, from our diplomacy on environment to 
our climate change policies; from our extensive Arctic research programmes to our 
policy supporting indigenous policies worldwide (European Parliament 2010a).  
 
The most important activity through which the EU is highlighting itself as an Arctic actor is 
the development and execution of its own Arctic policy. Also, the execution of the stated ac-
tivities highlights the EU’s importance for the Arctic.  However, the phenomenon also in-
cludes criticism towards the EU’s Arctic operations, which is presented mainly by certain 
Members of the Parliament. The critique has included questioning the legitimacy of EU’s 
involvement and the real motives behind EU’s Arctic policy. In the same Parliament debate 
where the High Representative made the above-mentioned statement, the following critique 
was presented by MEPs Anna Rosbach and Satu Hassi respectively: 
 
I so not think that the EU should have a policy for the [Arctic] area, nor do I think that the EU 
should take on an administrative role in the Arctic region. That would not be to the benefit of 
the Union or the Arctic. (European Parliament 2010a.) 
 
--[A] sort of cultural schizophrenia is apparent in our attitude to the Arctic region. On the one 
hand we are concerned. It’s quite obvious that climate change is taking place faster in the 
Arctic than elsewhere. -- While we are concerned about the situation, at the same time, an oil 
and gas rush has started in the Arctic. (European Parliament 2010a.)  
 
The basic arguments for EU legitimacy create the conditions for the phenomenon of EU being 
a key actor in the Arctic. This is broadened by the various responsibilities and interests that 
the EU expresses to have regarding the changes happening in the Arctic. In other words, the 
fact that several policies of the European Union have an impact on the Arctic in one way or 
another, and that the EU is an important consumer of the Arctic hydrocarbon resources create, 
at least according to the EU itself, the basis for being a key actor: 
 
Recalling the -- legitimate interests and position of the EU in terms of funding of re-
search, shipping and consumer power and taking into account the EU’s economical 
importance, Europe has lot to offer with regard to the protection and the sustainable 
development of the Arctic region (European Parliament 2010e).  
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As shown here, these conditions create a feel of responsibility for the EU, leading to actions 
such as environmental protection, research, promotion of sustainable development, and de-
veloping an Arctic policy. EU has wanted to communicate these ideas and achievements to all 
stakeholders while establishing and emphasizing an image of a responsible key actor. This in 
turn has led to the need to continue the various actions maintaining and enhancing the image.  
 
As a consequence to these actions, the European Commission has received some negative 
reactions both from the European Parliament and the Arctic states. The latter is shown by the 
Ilulissat declaration (see footnote 18) and the rejection from the Arctic Council. However, 
these setbacks have only motivated the Commission to continue its actions, changing slightly 
its approach in a more cooperative a way. Indeed, the most recent Communication from the 
Commission and High Representative Ashton accentuates that: 
 
The EU intends to refine its developing Arctic policy in close cooperation with its 
Member States, the five non-EU Arctic states as well as local inhabitants, including in-
digenous peoples (European Commission and… 2012a: 10).  
 
 
3.6 Protection of the Arctic environment 
 
 
The threat for the Arctic ecosystems caused by the increasing human activity on the Arctic 
and the importance of considering the environment and promoting sustainable development 
define the last category, named Protection of the Arctic environment. It doesn’t include the 
threat for the ecosystems caused by the climate change and the subsequent environmental 
change as those are discussed under the category of Changes in the unique Arctic. The overall 
dimensions for these properties are protecting and preserving the environment and biodiversi-
ty, the cautious and so called environment-friendly action, and sustainable development that, 
by definition, includes the environment, economic and social dimensions.  
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Protecting and preserving is a pair of words often used in the EU documents that I analyzed. 
According to Vladimír Špidla, Member of the Commission, this was defined already by the 
Commission’s conclusions in 200838: 
 
The communication will make the protection and preservation of the environment an 
absolute priority, although this should not necessarily rule out the sustainable use of 
the Arctic’s resources (European Parliament 2008a).  
 
The words are not defined in the documents but protection could be defined as an act to pre-
vent the Arctic from being damaged or degraded, whereas preservation could be defined as 
maintaining the Arctic unchanged and intact. Protection comes out in the documents as an 
activity conducted by the EU or the whole international community, concerning the Arctic 
environment as a whole, or smaller units such as biodiversity or the maritime environment. 
Highlighting these goals, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, as a representative of the Commission in a 
Parliament debate in 2009, urged: 
 
Let us never lose sight of our common goal, and let us work together with the Arctic 
states and the international community to find the best and most effective way of pre-
serving and protecting the Arctic for future generations (European Parliament 2009b).  
 
However, according to the data it seems inevitable that the Arctic resources are to be used. 
While protection is defined as a priority, the means of protection listed in the data are often 
fairly conservative.  They include sustainable use of the resources, cooperation with Arctic 
stakeholders as well as ‘environment-friendly’ action in accordance with high environmental 
standards and precautionary principle. This has been especially the view of the Commission, 
as shown in the following examples by Commission representative Benita Ferrefo-Waldner as 
well as jointly by the Commission and High Representative, respectively:  
 
--[I]t is not realistic to propose an international moratorium on the extraction of Arctic 
resources. -- However, we insist that the extraction and use of Arctic resources must 
always adhere to the highest possible standards for the environment and sustainability. 
(European Parliament 2009b.) 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????38?COM(2008)763fin?
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As climate change and economic development accelerate in the Arctic region, the Eu-
ropean Union should step up its engagement with its Arctic partners to jointly meet the 
challenge of safeguarding the environment while ensuring the sustainable development 
of the Arctic region (European Commission and… 2012a: 2).  
 
In  other  words,  the  use  of  the  resources  is  the  basis  for  the  action.  In  addition,  preservation  
seems to be just a word with no specific action for its premise. Perhaps it is seen to be 
achieved through protection. While the EU makes environmental protection a personal priori-
ty, it expects others to act accordingly. High Representative Catherine Ashton emphasized 
this in a Parliament debate: 
 
We [the Commission] want to make clear in all international discussions that Arctic re-
sources should only be accessed and exploited when we have the highest environmental 
and safety standards and when they are fully respected (European Parliament 2010a).  
 
Considering the conditions, actions and their consequences will help in recognizing the mo-
tives behind the phenomenon of EU’s wish to protect the Arctic environment. The conditions 
for the phenomenon are the changes that are happening in the unique Arctic environment and 
the environmental impacts that the environment faces due to increased human activity in the 
region. The action the EU is taking for protecting the environment are, as listed above, pro-
tecting and preserving the Arctic as well as promoting prudent activities and sustainable de-
velopment. These actions are conducted in the context of wide cooperation, existing govern-
ance, EU’s interests and responsibilities as well as the notion of the EU having much to offer 
to the Arctic. The pace of the change in the Arctic, the coherence between the three institu-
tions of the EU, as well  as the level of successful cooperation with the Arctic states and the 
level of legitimacy the EU receives, will all set the conditions for the action.  
 
Moreover, the actions have already for their part led to the development of an Arctic policy 
for the EU. In a role of the rapporteur of the Parliament’s resolution on a sustainable EU poli-
cy for the High North, MEP Michael Gahler stated in 2011:  
 
If we can apply this principle [of practicing the highest environmental standards] to the 
[Arctic] region as a whole through cooperation with local communities, then we will 
become a role model for other sensitive regions (European Parliament 2011b).  
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Indeed, if the EU succeeds in its actions for environmental protection in the Arctic, the future 
consequences of it might besides the environmental benefits be the increased recognition of 
the EU as a global environmental actor, the increased recognition of EU’s legitimacy in the 
Arctic affairs and the approval of the EU’s application for a permanent observer in the Arctic 
Council. Any of these consequences would likely motivate the EU for a further action in the 
Arctic.  
 
This  category  of  protection  of  the  Arctic  environment,  as  being  the  central  category  of  this  
study, will be further developed and discussed in chapter 4.2. 
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4 DISCUSSION 
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4.1 The construction of the EU’s Arctic policy 
 
 
The further purpose of axial coding is exploring and indicating the relationships of categories 
and making connections between them. When comparing all of the six categories with each 
other, it becomes evident that the changing conditions in the Arctic as well as the legitimacy 
of EU’s actions are the two themes common to most of the categories in the EU’s Arctic poli-
cy. 
 
 
4.1.1 Maintaining the Arctic discourse 
 
 
By  talking  about  the  various  problems  that  the  Arctic  is  facing  as  well  as  the  best  ways  to  
solve them, the EU talks them into existence and participates in keeping the discourse alive. 
The EU sees the problems self-evident facts, not questioning the origin of the discourse. It is 
noteworthy that while climate change and the subsequent environmental change are driven by 
certain inescapable natural laws, the reasons behind the need to utilize the Arctic resources 
are  not  so  much inevitable  but  rather  a  matter  of  social  conventions  and  policies.  As  Smith  
(2011: 290) remarks, there is no natural law determining the current global policy of continu-
ous economic growth39. 
 
The changes in the Arctic are having consequences for the whole world as already mentioned. 
This is likely to increase global attention to the region not only in terms of benefitting from 
the resources but also in terms of stakeholders wanting to have a say in how the change could 
be reduced or managed. The European Union is a perfect example of this. 
 
The growing use of Arctic resources, induced by climate change, is bound to have environ-
mental impacts. Additionally, the use of Arctic hydrocarbon resources further enhances cli-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????39?In?fact,?according?to?Smith?(2011:?290),?globalization?was?intentionally?generated?in?1940s.?
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mate change, thus creating a kind of vicious circle. These consequences call for increasing 
efforts in mitigating climate change and protecting the Arctic environment, which create a 
perfect opportunity for the EU to highlight its responsibilities and show its importance. As 
Airoldi (2008: 103) notes, the growing visibility and importance of climate change acts as a 
driver for EU policymaking. On the other hand, as Hossain (2010: 301) observes, the EU has 
to take a leading role in mitigating climate change in the Arctic area as it is itself so dependent 
on this region. Indeed, the climate change and especially its impacts on the Arctic have been 
one of the most important concerns in the EU documents since 2008, emphasized especially 
in 2008 when compared to 2012.  
 
Energy consumption is increasing in the EU and it lacks sufficient internal energy resources. 
This way access to the hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic is an important security issue for 
the EU and will make it dependent on Russia and Norway also in the future. The Commission 
predicted in 2007 that by 2030 the share of imported energy would be 84 percent for gas and 
93 percent for oil, having risen several percentage points especially for gas since the previous 
estimate in 2000 (Offerdal 2010: 32). This is because, as Hossain (2010: 299) predicts, re-
newable energy resources will not be able to entirely place the fossil fuels in the EU’s energy 
palette even in the long run. Cooperation with Russia and Norway in transferring new tech-
nology to the Arctic has thus been important for the EU in order to ensure sustainable and so 
called environment-friendly extraction and transportation of the energy resources. This kind 
of cooperation has also encouraged the use of best practices and high environmental standards 
(Hossain 2010: 301).  
 
It is doubtful whether any human activity may be environmentally friendly, especially when it 
comes to extraction of hydrocarbon resources in an area with a vulnerable ecosystem. Perhaps 
the only possibility of such an action would be leaving the region completely untouched, 
which is not even possible due to the inevitable effects of global climate change and trans-
boundary pollution. However, considering the environment has been the EU’s goal and visi-
ble in the Arctic policy documents as well. The EU’s institutions have increasingly noted the 
environmental impacts of human action in the Arctic as well as EU’s responsibility as a con-
sumer of Arctic resources. The promotion of high environmental standards has been equally 
visible in both the 2008 and 2012 documents, as also have been, although not quite as promi-
nently, the notion of EU’s leadership role in safe technology. It may be concluded that the EU 
in fact uses its responsibilities in the Arctic as grounds for its actions designed for the protec-
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tion of the Arctic, then also using them as grounds for its overall importance as an Arctic ac-
tor.  
 
The  variety  of  resources  is  often  mentioned  in  the  EU documents  regarding  the  Arctic.  The  
resources were one of the dominant topics especially in 2008 but in 2012 they are markedly 
less often mentioned. Presumably this is due to the resources and their potential already being 
established in the previous documents but it might also have been a conscious choice of the 
Commission in 2012 to stress other things, such as environmental protection and cooperation. 
Indeed, although being prominent topics already in 2008, environmental protection and sus-
tainable development have clearly gained more attention in the EU documents of 2012. What 
resources will in fact turn out to be feasible, as well as to what extent and with what kind of a 
time frame they will be extracted will determine the environmental impacts the extraction will 
have. Also the technology that will be used will have its effect and therefore the EU may in 
fact have an important role in reducing the environmental degradation that is bound to occur 
to some extent in any case. 
 
EU has various ways of showing its importance. It is globally recognized as an important ac-
tor in environment and climate policies (See i.e. Airoldi 2008: 43) and it has also expertise in 
research and developing the needed technology to the Arctic. An important aspect in the Arc-
tic policy of the EU is that since 2008 it has increasingly adduced Arctic issues in official 
documents and speeches thus participating in the verbal construction of the problems and 
means to their solution. As Jensen & Skedsmo (2010: 443-444) remark, the Arctic and the 
problems it is facing are “talked and written into existence”. In fact, at the same time as serv-
ing that purpose, the EU documents talk and write its own importance into existence as a 
problem-solver. In accordance with this observation, Østhagen (2011: 22) argues that the pub-
lications  of  the  European  Commission  and  Parliament  aim  at  presenting  the  EU  as  a  legiti-
mate Arctic actor, while trying to establish itself as a solution for many of the problems facing  
the Arctic.  
 
One way for the EU of establishing a role in the Arctic has been research and highlighting its 
own importance in this field has been quite prominent in the EU documents since 2008. 
Knowledge, enhanced by research, is a precondition for political action and policymaking 
(Hoel 2009: 455). Indeed, the Commission stated in 2008 that its goal is to “assess the state 
and evolution of the Arctic environment in order to contribute to the formulation of appropri-
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ate EU policies” (European Commission 2008: 6). By conducting research on the Arctic and 
highlighting it in its statements, the EU keeps up the discourse on the Arctic and its problems 
as  well  as  its  own opportunities  and  willingness  to  participate  in  the  solution.  This  way the  
EU strengthens the link between itself and the Arctic (Airoldi 2008: 106). The research serves 
another purpose as well. As according to the precautionary principle no significant actions 
should be put into practice before their effects are fully examined, research generates results 
that may be used in arguing for safe action.  
 
 
4.1.2 Gaining acceptance through cooperation 
 
 
The emergence of new resources due to the ongoing changes raises geopolitical issues and the 
question of a new type of governance in the Arctic. New solutions for the governance are 
needed not only for preventing potential disputes but also avoiding overuse of the region’s 
resources. Initially the EU documents on Arctic policy painted a relatively gloomy picture of 
the geopolitical situation in the Arctic as the threat of territorial claims were frequently point-
ed out. Also, such threatening outlooks as a race for resources or the risk of militarization 
were mentioned occasionally in 2008.  
 
There has been a change in perspective in 2012 as such threats are not mentioned at all, nor 
are the suggestions for a new type of governance that was still a common topic in 2008. In-
stead, bilateral cooperation with various Arctic actors, as well as on a global scale, was nota-
bly emphasized in 2012. Commenting on the latest developments of the EU’s Arctic policy, 
Offerdal (2012) has ended up with same kind of conclusions on the general trend- She re-
marks that the overall impression of the Commission’s and the High Representative’s newest 
communication is that of cooperation rather than “trying to meddle in other states’ affairs”. 
The tone of the EU’s Arctic policy in 2012 may be due to a change in perspective or to the 
fact that the geopolitical problems have already been well established in previous years. The 
fact that no Parliament documents were available for 2012 at the point of this analysis might 
also  distort  this  general  picture.  The  statements  of  the  MEPs have  often  been  more  colorful  
and mutable than the views of the Commission or the Council, as seen in the quotations in 
chapter 3. 
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One might ask whether the picture painted in the EU documents reflect the realistic situation 
in the Arctic or whether there is just a need to highlight its own expertise in building govern-
ance. According to Østhagen (2011: 17-18), the European Commission as well as the Parlia-
ment have purposely created a picture of an unstable situation in the Arctic where there is a 
need for the kind of diplomatic mediation the EU can facilitate. Multilateral governance has 
come up frequently in the EU documents as a solution for the Arctic governance, although it 
is not mentioned at all in 2012. Østhagen (Ibid.: 28) remarks, that as long as the bilateral ne-
gotiations between the Arctic states succeed, there is not even a need for the multilateral solu-
tions that the European Union is willing to provide. According to Airoldi (2010: 61), the EU 
should be ready to accept a less visible role in the Arctic cooperation compared to what it is 
pursuing, if it wishes to become more accepted as a player in the Arctic. 
 
When looking at the bigger picture painted in the documents, the EU tends to emphasize the 
need for global cooperation and it’s wish to build the governance on the existing framework, 
especially on UNCLOS (Airoldi 2010: 45). It also repeatedly expresses its support for the 
work of the Arctic Council as the primary body for circumpolar cooperation, which could be 
interpreted either as an acknowledgement of the leading role of the arctic states in the govern-
ance issues, or as a way of pleasing the Arctic Council in order to be seen as a good candidate 
for a permanent observer. The anticipation to be accepted to the Arctic Council at the upcom-
ing Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Kiruna in May 2013 comes up frequently in the 
2012 documents.  In these publications the EU also underlines its wish to cooperate with all 
Arctic stakeholders especially regarding the development of its Arctic policy.  
 
What could be the real motivation behind the EU’s wish to increase cooperation with all 
stakeholders? It is quite obvious that it desires to develop its policy so that it would be in ac-
cordance with the stakeholders’ wishes as far as possible so that the stakeholders might be 
pleased  with  the  EU’s  goals  and  means  to  achieve  them,  thus  gaining  acceptance  from  the  
stakeholders. However, by cooperation and taking others into account the EU wishes to be 
taken into account as well. By gaining this acceptance from the stakeholders to its Arctic 
agenda, the EU would simultaneously gain acceptance and recognition as an Arctic actor in-
creasing its legitimacy and importance in the Arctic. If the EU would succeed in this, it would 
be most beneficial for its aims both in protecting the Arctic environment and in exploiting the 
Arctic resources.  
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4.2 The environmental dimension of the Arctic policy 
 
 
There is an evident environmental aspect in the Arctic policy documents of the European Un-
ion. Indeed, according to Airoldi (2010: 30), the most important goal in the EU’s activities 
regarding  the  Arctic  is  the  protection  and  preservation  of  the  Arctic  environment  as  well  as  
considering the environmental aspects of all action. This can be seen throughout the data and 
the categories I have constructed. When it comes to protecting the environment in the Arctic 
region,  I  have  assembled  the  codes  under  the  category  of  “Protection  of  the  Arctic  environ-
ment”. I have presented this category along with its properties and dimensions in chapter 3.6. 
However, in terms of selective coding, I will now develop this category further, aspiring for a 
theory of how and why the environment aspects appear in the documents in the way they do. 
 
 
4.2.1 Perception of the Arctic environment 
 
 
The terms used in the documents, such as vulnerable, pristine, unique, fragile, and wilderness, 
paint a rather romantic picture of the Arctic. This kind of romantic perception, known at least 
from the times of the Norwegian explorer Fridtjof Nansen at the turn of the 20st century (see 
Emmerson 2010: 19), is still somewhat alive today. As defined by MEP Kriston Arsenis, the 
Arctic  is  “a  virgin  area  a  long  way  away”  (European  Parliament  2011b)  and,  as  MEP  Vér-
onique De Keyser has stated, “We want a North Pole that is clean--”(European Parliament 
2009b). Although the region is certainly unique and its ecosystems vulnerable to change, as 
described in chapter 1.4, the phenomenon per se is not unique as there are several other re-
gions in the world, so called biodiversity hotspots, where rich biodiversity is under threat. 
Indeed, as Dittmer et al. (2011: 202-203) have noted, the Arctic Ocean is often constructed as 
an exceptional region with, as they state, imaginative and affective characteristics, as well as 
an extraordinary environment. 
 
Environmental aspects in the document consist of different types of measures considering 
different parts of the Arctic ecosystem. The concepts regarding environmental protection are 
well represented in the documents. If one looks at the whole data since 2007, it is obvious that 
environmental protection as well as sustainable development and sustainable use of resources 
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are among the most common concepts. The importance of the protection has been on the in-
crease as seen when comparing the year 2012 to 2008. Environmental protection and sustain-
able development have gained quite significantly bigger a proportion of the attention in rela-
tion to the other concepts. In fact, in 2012, concepts regarding protection and sustainability 
have been the most common topics along with concepts concerning cooperation, giving other 
topics less attention. 
 
The current situation in the Arctic, including the climate change and its various consequences, 
create the need for environmental protection.  In fact, the use of the Arctic resources and envi-
ronmental protection in the region are so tightly linked that one might ask, whether there 
could be one without the other. The special features of the Arctic environment and the situa-
tion in geopolitics and governance create the background for the possibilities of protection 
and preservation. Similarly, the EU’s special features such as the experience in multilateral 
governance, research and global environmental politics, create the framework for combating 
the  problems.  Protection  and  especially  preservation  sometimes  seem  fairly  empty  terms  in  
the documents. These concepts originate nonetheless already from the Single European Act 
(SEA) in 1987 as goals of the EU’s environmental policy (Wilkinson 2002: 41). This way it is 
easier to understand why they appeared in the Arctic policy documents in 2008 insofar as the 
Arctic environment was addressed. 
 
In light of these observations it may be argued that the environmental aspects are well repre-
sented  in  the  documents  of  EU’s  Arctic  policy.  Different  topics  from maritime to  terrestrial  
problems to air pollutants and climate change are addressed. While climate change and its 
impacts as well as environmental protection as a general concept gain perhaps most of the 
attention, there are some aspects that clearly gain lesser attention. These include the heavy 
metal residues, trans-boundary pollution, ozone depletion, nuclear hazards, and animal wel-
fare in terms of i.e. whaling. There isn’t a clear explanation on why these aspects have not 
gained more attention other than the fact that climate change has globally become such a 
dominant discourse so that other issues are simply seen as less significant and thus more easi-
ly left unnoted. However, these issues are addressed by the EU, albeit they are not so exten-
sively present in the Arctic policy documents40. In fact, the ban of seal products imposed by 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????40?See for instance Regulation No 1005/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 
2009 on substances that deplete the ozone layer.?
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the European Parliament and Council in 200941 in the name of animal welfare has gained a lot 
of negative attention among certain Arctic countries complicating even the EU’s access to the 
Arctic Council (Blunden 2009: 135; Airoldi 2008: 90).      
 
 
4.2.2 The principle of sustainable development 
 
 
Crosscutting themes in the EU’s Arctic policy documents are climate change and sustainable 
development which both strongly associate to the category of environmental protection. Ac-
cording to Airoldi (2008: 43), the EU’s mitigating efforts both globally and on a domestic 
level in relation to the climate change are of significant value to the Arctic. However, as cli-
mate change has in this study been categorized under the category of “Changes in the unique 
Arctic”, it will not be discussed here in detail. Instead, sustainable development as including 
the domain of environmental protection is an important part of the category of “Protecting the 
Arctic environment”. It is in line with the EU’s objective to keep sustainable development as 
the central principle in all its policies.  
 
The Arctic seems an ideal place for putting sustainable development into practice. The envi-
ronmental aspect of it would naturally mean considering the environmental aspects of human 
activity in the region. Accordingly, sustainable use of the Arctic resources and promotion of 
cautious action are frequently mentioned in the EU documents. The social and cultural aspects 
of sustainability are also well represented in the documents. They state the EU’s position in 
taking local populations and especially indigenous peoples into account when planning and 
carrying out activities in the Arctic. The economic aspect of sustainability is less visible in the 
data.   
 
Since the Maastricht treaty in 1993, EU has wanted to maintain sustainable economic activi-
ties within its borders thus creating balance between economic efficiency and environmental 
sustainability (McCormick 2001: 4-5). Indeed, sustainable use of the Arctic resources is a 
concept that emerges quite frequently and steadily throughout the data. However, it is an am-
bivalent  concept  criticized  even  within  the  EU  by  certain  members  of  the  Parliament.  It  is  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????41?European?Parliament?Regulation 1007/2009?
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difficult to see that developing the Arctic resources would support maintaining the Arctic un-
changed or intact. Preservation cannot be achieved even if the development was executed 
considering the environment and according to the principles of sustainable development. One 
might thus question the motives behind the EU’s aspirations to get involved in the Arctic pol-
icy.  
 
 
4.2.3 Preserving environment or establishing legitimacy? 
 
 
Are the motives of the European Union for developing an Arctic policy really more economi-
cal than ecological, thus the economic activities being just camouflaged under the somewhat 
abstract and even trendy concepts of sustainable development and environmental protection? 
This kind of criticism is in this study classified under the category of “EU as a key actor in the 
Arctic” and only really seldom mentioned in the data, mostly in the Parliament debates. If the 
European Commission or the Council really wanted to contribute to the protection of the Arc-
tic  environment,  why  wouldn’t  they  pursue  the  50-year  moratorium  on  exploration  and  ex-
traction of mineral resources in the region, like suggested in 2009 by the Parliament in its 
Motion for a resolution on the international treaty for the protection of the Arctic (European 
Parliament 2009a)? This question was answered by the Parliament itself the next year when it 
stated that “the perception of the Arctic as a pristine and untouched place that solely needs to 
be preserved is not correct” as a growing world population will demand the sustainable man-
agement of the resources available (European Parliament 2010e).  
 
The reason for this subtle approach is the cooperative attitude that especially the Commission 
wishes to maintain and enhance. The Arctic countries do not support a moratorium or a new 
treaty for the protection of the Arctic environment, which is clearly stated in the Ilulissat dec-
laration (Young 2009a: 438). Consequently, in the debate relating to the above-mentioned 
motion for a resolution, a member of the Commission remarks that any attempt of changing 
the governance of the Arctic would weaken the opportunities for cooperation with the Arctic 
states (European Parliament 2009b). It might even be argued that the European Union pursues 
the protection of the Arctic for its own interests. By highlighting its responsibilities and 
means to solve the problems at hand, it can better argue its interests towards the Arctic. 
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Østhagen (2011: 17-18) argues that the EU has consciously created an image of itself as an 
indispensable environmental fighter that is needed in tackling the wide spectrum of the Arctic 
environmental issues.  
 
According to Østhagen (2011: 18), the majority of the environmental problems in the Arctic 
originate within the borders of the European Union. This fact is associated not only to the 
trans-boundary pollution but also to the consumption of the Arctic hydrocarbons. A simplified 
conclusion would be that the EU is thus creating the problems it’s devoted to solve hence cre-
ating the need and conditions for its own action. The EU has the best change to gain legitima-
cy through the environment aspect by being globally a recognized and leading actor in that 
field (Kelemen 2010: 335). Therefore it also has a motive to continue contributing to the envi-
ronmental problems in the Arctic. By gaining more legitimacy in the environmental field it 
might gain respect and legitimacy also in the other fields in the eyes of the Arctic states.  
 
So  what  has  been  the  real  motive  for  the  European  Union  to  develop  an  Arctic  policy:  the  
insensitive aim to take advantage of the Arctic resources and benefit economically, or the 
altruistic aim to protect and preserve the Arctic environment? I argue that neither of these are 
true but the underlying cause for the policy development has been a mixture of both of these 
motives.  It  is  clear  and  also  stated  in  the  data,  that  the  EU  has  interests  towards  the  Arctic  
resources. However, the concern for the various problems and threats the Arctic ecosystem is 
facing are clearly stated in the data as well. Along with international cooperation, protecting 
and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population as well as promoting sustainable use of 
natural resources have both been equal cornerstones of the EU Arctic policy since 2008. Ad-
ditionally, the importance of sustainable development appears frequently in the data. As the 
EU is such a recognized actor in global environmental politics, there is a justifiable reason to 
presume that it is serious when it comes to the protection of the Arctic environment. This is 
especially true as the changes in the region have such profound impacts on a global scale.  
 
Considering the EU’s role as a global environmental actor as well as its role in causing envi-
ronmental problems in the Arctic, I see that there is a chance for the EU to be able to make a 
significant contribution to the protection of the Arctic environment. However, this would re-
quire for the Arctic states to recognize the EU as a legitimate actor whose actions are justifia-
ble and with whom they are willing to cooperate. In this sense the work the EU does for the 
environment cannot be seen as altruistic, done solely for the sake of the environment. Envi-
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ronmental  aspects  have  been  one  of  the  strongest  motives  for  the  EU  to  develop  an  Arctic  
policy. If this policy would succeed as desired, it would result in further recognition of the EU 
as a global environmental actor and in increasing EU’s legitimacy in the Arctic, even bringing 
it the permanent observer status in the Arctic Council. As the results in the best case would be 
so significant, it is safe to say that this type of development has also to some extent been the 
motivator and goal in developing the environmental aspects of the Arctic policy. 
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5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
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The purpose of this study has been to find out how the Arctic is perceived in the eyes of the 
European  Union  as  well  as  how and  to  what  extent  the  environmental  dimension  emerge  in  
relation to other topics. A secondary purpose has been to examine how these perceptions have 
changed since the launching of the EU’s Arctic policy in 2008. I have used a comprehensive 
material that has covered all relevant documents that the EU has released concerning this pol-
icy domain. I have analyzed the material using Grounded theory, which has turned out to be a 
beneficial method in this kind of a study that does not rely on any existing theory. Mixing this 
qualitative method with a quantitative aspect has also turned out to be a useful approach to 
this study. Although analyzing the numerical data fairly briefly in the background of the qual-
itative part, it has nonetheless offered a wider perspective and a deeper insight for this study.  
 
The global causes and effects of the Arctic changes require a global response to them. This in 
turn requires cooperation in a wide scale. Indeed, as Young notes (2009a: 425-426), the grow-
ing interest towards the Arctic offers in the best case an opportunity to peaceful management 
of a large region, where new approaches to environmental governance could also be experi-
mented.  In  any  case,  the  days  of  the  dominance  of  the  Arctic  five  will  soon  be  over  as,  ac-
cording to Young (2009a: 430-431) they will be forced to acknowledge the claims of other 
stakeholders as well. This is because a range of non-state actors, that are not dependent on the 
regulations  of  the  Arctic  Council,  are  going  to  try  and  benefit  from the  Arctic  opportunities  
(Young 2009a: 430).  
 
The Arctic, previously only of peripheral importance to the EU, has been gaining increasing 
attention within its institutions (Airoldi 2008: 13). This may be concluded for instance in the 
Parliament debates on Arctic issues, where the number of statements have been on the in-
crease since 2008. While there were only eight statements made in the 2008 debate and 13 the 
following year, there was a leap to 35 statements in 2010, following 32 statements in 2011. It 
is  notable,  though,  that  it  is  the  same  MEPs,  who  for  the  most  part  are  from  the  Member  
States that have Arctic territories or Baltic Sea coastline, that often participate these debates. 
(European Parliament 2008a; 2009b; 2010a; 2011b.) This supports the idea that the EU’s Arc-
tic policy has not been created solely by the institutions but Member States and even individ-
uals have driven this process by pursuing their own agendas and influencing the Commission 
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(Airoldi 2008: 13; Østhagen 2011: 14-15). Furthermore, each document that has been re-
leased has initiated public discourse, which in turn has shaped the next policy document (Jen-
sen & Skedsmo 2010, 444). 
 
This study has shown that several topics are discussed in the EU’s documents relating to the 
Arctic region. These topics include the changes that the Arctic region is facing, the emerging 
resources, the geopolitical situation and the governance of the region, the EU’s role in the 
Arctic as well as the protection of the Arctic environment. The numerical data has shown that 
these topics have been discussed in different frequencies and that the focus of the documents 
has changed over the years from the Arctic resources and a range of problems towards the 
importance of cooperation and environmental protection in the region. The EU has main-
tained the discourse of the Arctic problems and of its own capabilities to solve them, thus 
enhancing its own importance in providing governance options, research, environmental pro-
tection and safe technology for resource extraction for the Arctic region.  
 
According  to  the  EU’s  Arctic  policy  documents,  the  general  pattern  often  seems  similar  to  
how the EU is constructing its view of “what’s going on” in the Arctic. The discourse starts 
from a change, in the form of either climate change or environmental change. It proceeds to 
the EU’s means and ability to solve the arising problems, highlighting its responsibilities and 
in this way justifying its participation on Arctic affairs and its legitimacy as an actor. Indeed, 
the work that the EU aspires to do in the Arctic serves many of the Unions interests. These 
include economic and security interests, interests in environmental protection and climate 
change mitigation, and finally interests in constructing its own identity as well as gaining le-
gitimacy and global recognition. The documents released in 2012 don’t hold any big surprises 
in terms of the direction of this policy domain, as Offerdal (2012) remarks. However, accord-
ing to Offerdal (2012), the EU now states its interests more clearly than before, as well as its 
aim to pursue them. 
 
When it specifically comes to the environmental dimension, this study has shown that envi-
ronmental aspects and their various dimensions are well represented in the EU’s Arctic policy 
documents. The importance of environmental protection and sustainable development has 
been on the increase while climate change and its impacts as well as environmental protection 
as a general concept have gained most of the attention. It is possible that since 2008 there has 
been a change from a discourse of geopolitical/political realism towards a discourse of eco-
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system-based management in the EU’s Arctic policy (see Young 2009a: 434). When compar-
ing the concepts in 2008 and 2012, the ones related to ecosystem-based management, i.e. 
themes of cooperation and environmental protection come up in somewhat similar frequen-
cies. However, in comparison to 2012, concepts relating to territorial conflicts and competi-
tion over the Arctic resources were significantly more frequent in 2008. In fact, hardly any of 
these concepts are mentioned at all in 2012 while in 2008 the concept of territorial claims was 
one of the most commonly mentioned in the documents. This is nevertheless only speculation 
as there isn’t a complete data available yet for 2012 and any statement especially from the 
Parliament could alter these proportions. Thus it would be an interesting subject for a further 
research to see whether this intuition really holds some truth in it.   
 
The EU has nevertheless not suggested internationally any major initiatives towards a com-
prehensive protection of the Arctic environment, as especially the Commission has been care-
ful not to jeopardize its deliberative reputation and the possibility to cooperation with the Arc-
tic states. The three main goals of the Commission’s view of the Arctic policy have included 
protection and preservation of the Arctic environment as well as elements of sustainable de-
velopment. The Council has also accepted these goals for the EU’s Arctic policy. The Parlia-
ment in turn has had a somewhat different kind of view as to what kind of a policy the EU 
should pursue in the Arctic. A further research on the language used by each of these institu-
tions would be in place as it has not been in the scope of this study. This analysis would re-
veal how frequently the different concepts are mentioned by these institutions, thus indicat-
ing, which of them are most in favor of environmental protection and which in favor of Arctic 
development. It is an interesting question whether there will be more coherence in the views 
of these institutions and whether they will pursue the same goals more than has been seen so 
far. This question will be answered to some degree when the Parliament and the Council state 
their  views  on  the  new line  for  the  Arctic  policy  that  the  Commission  and  the  High  Repre-
sentative have presented in 2012. 
 
The EU has much to offer in several domains from environmental protection to Arctic devel-
opment and cooperation. European Commission states that the EU has made significant pro-
gress on 47 proposals that were made in 2008 concerning the Arctic (European Commission 
2012a). In a sense, as having something for everybody, the EU might not have wanted to spe-
cialize in one domain, such as environmental protection, in order to be able to gain wider ac-
ceptance among the Arctic stakeholders. Indeed, the EU is still facing a challenge in defend-
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ing  its  legitimacy  as  an  Arctic  actor  in  the  eyes  of  the  Arctic  states  as  well  as  other  Arctic  
stakeholders (Airoldi 2010: 10). The European Commission has had an incentive to start de-
veloping an Arctic policy in order to gain this legitimacy and show its importance in solving 
the Arctic issues (Østhagen 2011: 23).  
 
There is a chance for the EU to be able to make a significant contribution to the protection of 
the Arctic environment. However, that would require, on the one hand, that the EU be recog-
nized as a legitimate actor and, on the second hand, that the Arctic states would be willing to 
cooperate with it. If these requirements were met, they would highly benefit the EU in other 
domains as well, as it would internationally gain recognition as a global environmental actor. 
Indeed, this study has shown that that the motivation for the EU to include environmental 
dimension in its Arctic policy has been to gain recognition globally, but especially among the 
Arctic states, thus being acknowledged as a legitimate Arctic actor. The grounds for the desire 
for protection in turn have evolved from the responsibilities the EU feels towards the Arctic. 
According to Østhagen (Ibid.: 8, 26), the Commission has simultaneously wanted to ensure its 
institutional survival as well as securing its interests in the prospective ”scramble for the Arc-
tic”. 
 
However, the EU is already globally recognized as an ambitious supporter of environmental 
protection. This way there is all the reason to presume that the EU is serous when it comes to 
protecting the Arctic environment, which cannot be seen merely as a means to achieve other 
ends. On the other hand, the goals for protecting the Arctic environment are very much in line 
with the Environment Action Programme that set the overall goals for environmental policy. 
It  is  therefore  not  justifiable  to  argue  that  the  protection  of  the  Arctic  environment  is  some-
how different or special compared to the environmental policy that the EU pursues in other 
regions. However, a further and a more comprehensive research on the environmental dimen-
sion of the EU’s Arctic policy would have to be conducted in order to find out exactly how 
the environmental concepts used in the EU’s Arctic policy documents relate to the general 
ideals of the EU’s environmental policy. 
 
The ultimate challenge in the protection of the Arctic environment is improving the environ-
mental standards of Russian companies. According to Emmerson (2010: 247) the massive 
development of the Russian Arctic is eventually going to result in environmental damage of 
some degree caused by oil spills on land or at sea. Enhancing the environmental standards has 
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also been one of the goals of the EU throughout its Arctic policy documents. The EU aims for 
sustainable development and, above all, sustainable and “environmental friendly” use of the 
Arctic resources.  While reading the EU’s documents,  it  feels as though the extraction of the 
Arctic resources is acceptable as long as in the same sentence there is a mention of the possi-
ble environmental impacts and the aim to prevent them. However, both the Commission and 
the Parliament, albeit the latter not unanimously, agree nowadays that it is not realistic to cre-
ate an “Arctic museum” (see i.e. European Parliament 2010e) thus not pursuing a moratorium 
to the region.  
 
As more and more of the EU’s Member States are forming their goals concerning the Arctic 
region and as the negotiations of Iceland’s membership proceed, it is clear, as also Østhagen 
(2011: 27) notes, that the Arctic is going to be a high priority on the agenda of the EU’s for-
eign policy also in the future. The potential accession of Iceland will undoubtedly change the 
course of EU’s Arctic policy to some extent, impacting its interests, responsibilities and legit-
imacy towards the region. Nevertheless, the EU and especially the Commission has made it 
clear that it wants to proceed the developing of its policy in cooperation with Arctic stake-
holders, most importantly with the Arctic states. What’s more, the future of the Arctic policy 
depends also on the general economic and political situation, as well as on the support that the 
EU gets from its Member States, non-EU Arctic states, and, most importantly, from the Arctic 
Council (Airoldi 2008: 104; 2010: 61). 
 
It  will  be interesting to see how the EU institutions and the Arctic stakeholders will  react to 
the latest conclusion of the Commission and the High Representative, which specifically asks 
for their opinions for the basis of the future development of this policy domain (European 
Commission and… 2012a, p. 5). It is unfortunate that these comments were not available in 
time of this study, as the communication was so much delayed from its original deadline. 
However, it is probable that not only the Council, but also the Parliament will be supportive 
towards the conclusions and that the opinion of the Parliament will be fairly moderate like it 
has been during the recent years. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen, whether the new direc-
tion of the EU’s Arctic policy will impress the Arctic Council and whether the EU will slowly 
gain more respect as a legitimate actor in the Arctic, hence being able to pursue not only its 
economic interests but its vision for environmental protection as well. On the other hand, suc-
ceeding in its endeavors on the protection of the Arctic environment would be a good way for 
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the EU to show its importance in practice, thus gaining recognition and credibility in the eyes 
of the non-EU Arctic states. 
 
Along the lines of the discourse of ecosystem-based management, sustainability would be a 
beneficial approach and state of mind when it comes to managing the Arctic. The features of 
the Arctic makes it an ideal region to put sustainable development in practice in all its dimen-
sions, that is in economic and environmental as well as in social and cultural domains. As a 
state of mind, sustainable development would prevent negative changes in geopolitics and the 
lurking race for resources as environment, local population and sustainable economic growth 
would be the premises of all action. In a competitive world where steady, or even maximum 
economic growth seems to be the first priority, this vision may be more of idealism than real-
ism. However, it is something to aspire for and the EU, maybe not yet as a legitimate actor in 
the Arctic but nevertheless as a strong opinion leader, has a fair opportunity to pursue this 
goal.  
? ?
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navigation 2 
V 
Importance of continuing EU 
research in the Arctic 18 
 
V 
EU's leadership in safe 
technology 3 
 
V 
EU as main contributor to 
GHGs in the Arctic 2 
VI 
Temporary/long moratorium 
for some/all resources 18 
 
V 
Need to improve coordina-
tion in EU on Arctic issues 3 
 
V Other EU expertiece 2 
I Unique environment 17 
 
IV 
EU applying for a permanent 
observer in AC 3 
 
V Arctic Information Centre 2 
I Challenging conditions 17 
 
V Monitoring the Arctic 3 
 
III 
Promotion of peaceful 
settlement of disputes 2 
V 
EU's security / geostrategic 
interests 17 
 
V 
Importance of continuing EU 
research in the Arctic 3 
 
VI Preserving the Arctic 2 
V 
EU's leading role in  
environmental policy 17 
 
I Unspoiled wilderness 2 
 
I 
Supporting renewables 
energy 2 
III 
Promoting stability  
in the Arctic 17 
 
V EU must be taken to account 2 
 
I 
Arctic's importance in  
global warming 1 
III 
Promotion of peaceful 
settlement of disputes 17 
 
I Challenges caused by change 2 
 
V 
Member States in Arctic 
region / AC 1 
II 
Promotion of freedom of 
navigation 16 
 
II Tourism 2 
 
V Arctic EEA members 1 
V 
Arctic resources as supply  
for EU 16 
 
II Advantages of routes 2 
 
III Changes in geopolitics 1 
IV 
Problems of existing  
governance 16 
 
V 
EU in the Barents-Euro-Arctic 
Council 2 
 
V EU as a concerned actor 1 
II Advantages of routes 15 
 
V Arctic Information Centre 2 
 
V EU has much to offer 1 
V Other EU expertiece 15 
 
III Risk of militarization 2 
 
V High time for action 1 
V 
EU in the Barents-Euro-Arctic 
Council 15 
 
VI 
Environmental aspects 
particularly important 2 
 
II 
Potential environmental 
catastrophe 1 
II 
Potential environmental 
catastrophe 14 
 
VI 
Temporary/long moratorium 
for some/all resources 2 
 
VI 
Environmental aspects 
particularly important 1 
I Unspoiled wilderness 13 
 
VI 
Precautionary principle / 
cautious approach 2 
 
VI 
Promoting environment-
friendly action 1 
III 
Need for demilitarization in 
the Arctic 13 
 
IV 
Existing legal framework 
sufficient 2 
 
I Unspoiled wilderness   
V EU has much to offer 12 
 
I 
Opportunities of climate 
change 1 
 
V EU must be taken to account   
II 
Resources of renewable 
energy 11 
 
I 
Environmental change in the 
Arctic 1 
 
II 
Promoting open access to 
resources   
V 
Arctic change's negative 
impact on Europe 11 
 
II Arctic development 1 
 
V 
Arctic resources as supply  
for EU   
V 
EU's leadership in safe 
technology 11 
 
V 
Arctic change's negative 
impact on Europe 1 
 
V 
EU's security / geostrategic 
interests   
VI 
Promoting environment-
friendly action 11 
 
V EU's responsibilities 1 
 
V 
Need to improve coordina-
tion in EU on Arctic issues   
V EU must be taken to account 10 
 
V Other EU expertiece 1 
 
III 
Promoting stability in the 
Arctic   
I Challenges caused by change 10 
 
V EU has much to offer 1 
 
III 
Respect for Arctic nations' 
sovereignty   
V 
EU as consumer of Arctic 
resources 10 
 
III 
Respect for Arctic nations' 
sovereignty 1 
 
V 
Promoting freedom of 
research in the Arctic   
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V EU as a concerned actor 10 
 
V EU is not a legitime actor 1 
 
V Cultural schizophrenia   
V 
Need to improve coordina-
tion in EU on Arctic issues 10 
 
V 
EU shouldn't get involved in 
the Arctic 1 
 
V EU is not a legitime actor   
III Risk of militarization 10 
 
V 
EU has economic interests as 
priority 1 
 
V 
EU shouldn't get involved in 
the Arctic   
II 
Environmental Impact  
Assessment 9 
 
IV 
Cooperation with other 
stakeholders 1 
 
V 
EU has economic interests as 
priority   
V 
EU as main contributor to 
GHGs in the Arctic 8 
 
III Arctic as a common concern 1 
 
V 
Criticism on EU environmen-
tal policy   
V EU is not a legitime actor 8 
 
II Risk of unregulated fisheries 1 
 
III 
Potential for an international 
security threat   
V 
EU shouldn't get involved in 
the Arctic 8 
 
II 
Environmental Impact  
Assessment 1 
 
III 
Territorial claims in the 
Arctic region   
III Arctic as a common concern 8 
 
II 
Reduce environmental 
impacts 1 
 
III Race for resources   
I 
Supporting renewables 
energy 8 
 
I 
Supporting renewables 
energy 1 
 
III Risk of militarization   
II 
Promoting open access to 
resources 7 
 
V 
Iceland's potential EU  
membership   
 
III 
Need for demilitarization in 
the Arctic   
VI Moratorium not supported 7 
 
II 
Resources of renewable 
energy   
 
III Non-Arctic actors (e.g. China)   
V 
EU has economic interests as 
priority 6 
 
V 
EU as consumer of Arctic 
resources   
 
III Arctic as a common concern   
V 
Criticism on EU environmen-
tal policy 5 
 
V 
EU as main contributor to 
GHGs in the Arctic   
 
VI 
Temporary/long moratorium 
for some/all resources   
VI 
Environmental aspects 
particularly important 5 
 
V 
Promoting freedom of 
research in the Arctic   
 
VI Moratorium not supported   
IV 
Conventions and agreements 
applying to Arctic 5 
 
V Cultural schizophrenia   
 
II Risk of unregulated fisheries   
III Non-Arctic actors (e.g. China) 4 
 
V 
Criticism on EU  
environmental policy   
 
VI 
Emergency response  
management (ERM)   
VI 
Emergency response mana-
gement (ERM) 4 
 
III Non-Arctic actors (e.g. China)   
 
II 
Reduce environmental 
impacts   
V Cultural schizophrenia 3 
 
II 
Potential environmental 
catastrophe   
 
IV 
Problems of existing  
governance   
II Risk of unregulated fisheries 3 
 
VI Moratorium not supported   
 
IV 
Potential need for new 
governance / treaty   
V 
Promoting freedom of 
research in the Arctic 2 
 
VI 
Emergency response mana-
gement (ERM)   
 
IV 
Existing legal framework 
sufficient   
II 
Reduce environmental 
impacts 2 
 
IV 
Conventions and agreements 
applying to Arctic   
 
IV Multilateral governance   
I 
Climate change reduction by 
not using Arctic reserves 2 
 
I 
Climate change reduction by 
not using Arctic reserves   
 
I 
Climate change reduction by 
not using Arctic reserves   
    Categories 
I Changes in the unique Arctic 
II Emerging Arctic resources and new navigation routes 
III Geopolitical change and implications for global security 
IV The governance of the Arctic 
V EU  as a key actor in the Arctic 
VI Protection of the Arctic environment 
?
